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Social networking sites and blogs have increasingly become breeding 
grounds for anonymous online groups that attack women, people of color, and 
members of other traditionally disadvantaged classes.  These destructive 
groups target individuals with defamation, threats of violence, and technology-
based attacks that silence victims and concomitantly destroy their privacy.  
Victims go offline or assume pseudonyms to prevent future attacks, 
impoverishing online dialogue and depriving victims of the social and 
economic opportunities associated with a vibrant online presence.  Attackers 
manipulate search engines to reproduce their lies and threats for employers 
and clients to see, creating digital “scarlet letters” that ruin reputations. 
Today’s cyber-attack groups update a history of anonymous mobs coming 
together to victimize and subjugate vulnerable people.  The social science 
literature identifies conditions that magnify dangerous group behavior and 
those that tend to defuse it.  Unfortunately, Web 2.0 technologies accelerate 
mob behavior.  With little reason to expect self-correction of this intimidation 
of vulnerable individuals, the law must respond. 
General criminal statutes and tort law proscribe much of the mobs’ 
destructive behavior, but the harm they inflict also ought to be understood and 
addressed as civil rights violations.  Civil rights suits reach the societal harm 
that would otherwise go unaddressed and would play a crucial expressive role 
in condemning online mob activity.  Acting against these attacks does not 
offend First Amendment principles when they consist of defamation, true 
threats, intentional infliction of emotional distress, technological sabotage, 
and bias-motivated abuse aimed to interfere with a victim’s employment 
opportunities.  To the contrary, it helps preserve vibrant online dialogue and 
promote a culture of political, social, and economic equality. 
INTRODUCTION 
New technologies generate economic progress by reducing the costs of 
socially productive activities.  Unfortunately, those same technologies often 
reduce the costs of socially destructive activities.  Our legal system depends 
upon naturally occurring costs to deter much anti-social behavior.1  A 
 
1 Thus, the economic inefficiency of wrong-doing, rather prosaically, should join morals, 
religion, and law on Dean Pound’s list of the “major agencies of social control.”  ROSCOE 
POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 18 (Transaction Publishers 1997) (1942) 
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reduction in these costs often requires extending law to new classes of 
behavior. 
Technology minimizes the costs of pro- and anti-social behavior through 
two opposing types of changes.  Technology disaggregates.  Communication 
advances allow people to separate their ideas from their physical presence.  
This is equally true for the scientist, the venture capitalist, and the criminal.  At 
the same time, technology aggregates.  Transportation advances allow a 
business to collaborate with far-flung strangers in various states.  These same 
advances allow a computer hacker and a financial whiz to form a more 
efficient identity-theft ring and to permit terrorists to strike from afar.2  Better 
communications allow researchers in one place to advance a concept 
conceived in another, but they also allow a criminal in one place to send 
directions on bomb-making to another who has obtained materials from 
somewhere else.  The challenge for law is to foster positive applications of 
technology’s disaggregative and aggregative potential while understanding and 
checking as many of its destructive applications as possible. 
An anti-social behavior that commonly results from technological and 
economic progress is civil rights abuse.  As communication, travel, and trade 
become cheaper, and as specialized information becomes easier to transmit, 
people become freer to specialize in work for which they hold a comparative 
advantage.  Specialization and commodification generate efficiencies, allowing 
skills to be matched more precisely with work to be done and allowing 
products to be matched more effectively with demand.  They also, however, 
lead to stratification, alienation, and efforts to extend commodification so far 
as to threaten humanity and individuality. 
For example, this was true when intercontinental land and sea travel allowed 
the sharing of crops, but also facilitated the slave trade.  The Industrial 
Revolution, and subsequent waves of automation, similarly multiplied 
economic output while ushering in new means of degrading workers and the 
environment.3  In our own time, advances in genetics open new doors to bio-
medical research and to new kinds of employment discrimination.  It is equally 
true in our cyber age. 
The Internet raises important civil rights issues through both its aggregative 
and disaggregative qualities.  Online, bigots can aggregate their efforts even 
when they have insufficient numbers in any one location to form a 
conventional hate group.  They can disaggregate their offline identities from 
their online presence, escaping social opprobrium and legal liability for 
destructive acts. 
 
(explaining that social control is maintained by pressure from our fellow man to uphold 
civilized society and avoid anti-social conduct). 
2 Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 7, on file with author). 
3 Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 360, 364 (3d ed. 2005).  
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Both of these qualities are crucial to the growth of anonymous online mobs 
that attack women, people of color, religious minorities, gays, and lesbians.  
On social networking sites, blogs, and other Web 2.0 platforms, destructive 
groups publish lies and doctored photographs of vulnerable individuals.4  They 
threaten rape and other forms of physical violence.5  They post sensitive 
personal information for identity thieves to use.6  They send damaging 
statements about victims to employers and manipulate search engines to 
highlight those statements for business associates and clients to see.7  They 
flood websites with violent sexual pictures and shut down blogs with denial-of-
service attacks.8 These assaults terrorize victims, destroy reputations, corrode 
privacy, and impair victims’ ability to participate in online and offline society 
as equals. 
Some victims respond by shutting down their blogs and going offline.9  
Others write under pseudonyms to conceal their gender,10 a reminder of 
nineteenth-century women writers George Sand and George Eliot.11  Victims 
who stop blogging or writing under their own names lose the chance to build 
robust online reputations that could generate online and offline career 
opportunities. 
Kathy Sierra’s story exemplifies the point.  Ms. Sierra, a software developer, 
maintained a blog called “Creating Passionate Users.”12  In early 2007, a group 
of anonymous individuals attacked Ms. Sierra on her blog and two other 
websites, MeanKids.org and unclebobism.com.13  Posters threatened rape and 
 
4 See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON 
THE INTERNET 81-82 (2007). 
5 Jessica Valenti, How the Web Became a Sexists’ Paradise, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Apr. 6, 
2007, at 16, available at  http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/apr/06/gender.blogging. 
6 See Azy Barak, Sexual Harassment on the Internet, 23 SOC. SCI. COMPUTER REV. 77, 80 
(2005). 
7 See infra notes 49 and 72 and accompanying text. 
8 Anna Greer, Op-Ed., Misogyny Bares Its Teeth on Internet, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD 
(Australia), Aug. 21, 2007, at 15, available at 
http://www.smh.com.au/news/opinion/misogyny-bares-its-teeth-on-
internet/2007/08/20/1187462171087.html.  Denial-of-service attacks occur when an online 
group or individual forces a victim offline.  See supra note 51. 
9 Ellen Nakashima, Sexual Threats Stifle Some Female Bloggers, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 
2007, at A1. 
10 Id. 
11 Mary Sarah Bilder, The Shrinking Back: The Law of Biography, 43 STAN. L. REV. 299, 
327 n.161 (1991). 
12 Creating Passionate Users, http://headrush.typepad.com/creating_passionate_users/ 
(last visited Nov. 24, 2008). 
13 Don Park’s Daily Habit, http://donpark.wordpress.com/ (Mar. 16, 2008, 17:09) (on file 
with author); Posting of Zephoria to Apophenia, Safe Havens for Hate Speech Are 
Irresponsible, http://www.zephoria.org/thoughts/archives/2007/03/26/safe_havens_for.html 
(Mar. 26, 2007, 20:20). 
  
2009] CYBER CIVIL RIGHTS 65 
 
strangulation.14  Others revealed her home address and Social Security 
number.15  Individuals posted doctored photos of Ms. Sierra.  One picture 
featured Ms. Sierra with a noose beside her neck.16  The poster wrote: “The 
only thing Kathy has to offer me is that noose in her neck size.”17  Another 
photograph depicted her screaming while being suffocated by lingerie.18  
Blogger Hugh MacLeod describes the posters as perpetrating a virtual group 
rape with the site operators “circling [the rapists], chanting ‘Go, go, go.’”19 
The attacks ravaged Ms. Sierra’s sense of personal security.  She suspended 
her blog, even though the blog enhanced her reputation in the technological 
community.20  She canceled public appearances and feared leaving her 
backyard.21  Ms. Sierra explained: “I will never feel the same.  I will never be 
the same.”22 
Although in theory anonymous online mobs could attack anyone, in practice 
they overwhelmingly target members of traditionally subordinated groups, 
particularly women.23  According to a 2006 study, individuals writing under 
female names received twenty-five times more sexually threatening and 
malicious comments than posters writing under male names.24  The 
organization Working to Halt Online Abuse reports that, in 2006, seventy 
percent of the 372 individuals it helped combat cyber harassment were 
 
14 Greg Sandoval, Blogger Cancels Conference Appearance After Death Threats, CNET 
NEWS, Mar. 26, 2007, http://www.news.com/8301-10784_3-6170683-7.html. 
15 Valenti, supra note 5. 
16 Sandoval, supra note 14. 
17 Id. 
18 Valenti, supra note 5.  Although MeanKids.org’s site operator initially refused to 
censor the postings due to his “Own Your Own Words” philosophy, he took down the site 
after Ms. Sierra expressed distress about them.  Posting of Jim Turner to One by One Media, 
http://www.onebyonemedia.com/the-sierra-saga-part-1-dissecting-the-creation-of-the-kath 
(Mar. 28, 2007, 16:31 EST) [hereinafter Jim Turner]. 
19 Jim Turner, supra note 18. 
20 Blog Death Threats Spark Debate, BBC NEWS, Mar. 27, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/technology/6499095.stm. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Posting of Lisa Stone to BlogHer, http://www.blogher.com/node/17319 (Mar. 27, 
2007, 3:47) (explaining that countless women have been threatened with rape, 
dismemberment, and violent images in online forums such as message boards and blog 
comments). 
24 Robert Meyer & Michel Cukier, Assessing the Attack Threat Due to IRC Channels, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON DEPENDABLE SYSTEMS AND 
NETWORKS 467 (2006), available at http://www.enre.umd.edu/content/rmeyer-assessing.pdf 
(finding that individuals with ambiguous names were less likely to receive malicious 
messages than female users, but more likely to receive them than male users). 
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female.25  In half of those cases, the victims had no connection to their 
attackers.26  These mobs also focus on people of color, religious minorities, 
gays, and lesbians.27 
These attacks are far from the only new challenge to civil rights in this 
Information Age,28 but they are a serious one.  Without an effective response to 
both aggressive, bigoted attacks and to more passive forms of exclusion, online 
equality is more of a slogan than a reality. 
Nonetheless, the development of a viable cyber civil rights agenda faces 
formidable obstacles.  First, because it must fill the gap left when the Internet’s 
disaggregation allows individuals to escape social stigma for abusive acts, the 
cyber civil rights agenda must be fundamentally pro-regulatory.  A regulatory 
approach clashes with libertarian ideology that pervades online communities. 
Second, civil rights advocacy must address inequalities of power.  This may 
seem incongruous to those who believe – with considerable justification in 
many spheres – the Internet has eliminated inequalities by allowing 
individuals’ voices to travel as far as those of major institutions.  This 
assumption may slow recognition of the power of misogynistic, racist, or other 
bigoted mobs to strike under cloak of anonymity, without fear of 
consequences. 
Third, a cyber civil rights agenda must convince a legal community still 
firmly rooted in the analog world that online harassment and discrimination 
profoundly harm victims and deserve redress.  In particular, proponents of 
cyber civil rights must convince courts and policymakers that the archaic 
version of the acts-words dichotomy fails to capture harms perpetrated online.  
The Internet’s aggregative character turns expressions into actions and allows 
geographically-disparate people to combine their actions into a powerful force.  
Those who fail to appreciate the Internet’s aggregative powers may be inclined 
to dismiss many of the harms, perhaps citing “the venerable maxim de minimis 
non curat lex (‘the law cares not for trifles’).”29  For example, an online mob’s 
capacity to manipulate search engines in order to dominate what prospective 
 
25 WORKING TO HALT ONLINE ABUSE, 2006 CYBERSTALKING STATISTICS 1 (2006), 
http://www.haltabuse.org/resources/stats/2006Statistics.pdf. 
26 Id. 
27 See infra notes 54-56, 89, 103, 121-127, 131, 143 and accompanying text. 
28 The Internet also confers great opportunities on those with the physical and intellectual 
capital to aggregate with others who are similarly situated, but in so doing it furthers the 
disadvantage of those who do not share the same physical and intellectual capital.  The 
“digital divide” resembles the enhanced isolation that pervasive telephone ownership 
imposes on those who cannot afford and that structured, urban environments impose on the 
homeless.  For an explanation of how the “digital divide” operates, see generally Allen S. 
Hammond, IV, The Telecommunications Act of 1996: Codifying the Digital Divide, 50 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 179 (1997). 
29 See Wis. Dep’t of Revenue v. Wrigley, 505 U.S. 214, 231 (1992).  Courts invoked this 
maxim to deny relief to those injured at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution.  
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 71 (1977). 
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employers learn about its victim, by aggregating hundreds or thousands of 
individual defamatory postings, may not be grasped by judges accustomed to a 
world in which defamers’ messages either reached a mass audience or were 
sent specifically to recipients known to the defamer.  Much as the northern 
media initially dismissed the Ku Klux Klan’s violence in the early 1870s as 
“horseplay” borne of “personal quarrels,”30 so have many viewed the 
destruction wrought by online groups as harmless pranks. 
Fourth, cyber civil rights advocates must overcome the free speech 
argument asserted by online abusers.  Perpetrators of cyber civil rights abuses 
commonly hide behind powerful free speech norms that both online and offline 
communities revere.  Just as the subjugation of African Americans was 
justified under the rubrics of states’ rights and freedom of contract, destructive 
online mobs invoke free speech values even as they work to suppress the 
speech of women and people of color.31 
Fifth, a cyber civil rights agenda must be sure to highlight the harms 
inflicted on traditionally subjugated groups, because online civil rights abuses 
typically affect members of these traditionally subjugated groups 
disproportionately, but not universally.  This makes the problem less 
conspicuous and easier to dismiss, much as the fact that the existence of some 
people of color and women work and learn in a given workplace or school may 
give the erroneous impression that hiring or admissions procedures do not 
impose disproportionate burdens on members of those groups. 
Finally, applying civil rights norms to the technological advances of the 
Information Age requires overcoming the same challenges that law faces in 
coping with any sweeping social change: inevitable false starts threaten to 
discredit all legal intervention, giving credibility to arguments that law must 
ignore harms resulting from new technologies to avoid bringing progress to a 
grinding halt.32 
This Article analyzes the problem of anonymous online mobs that target 
women, people of color, and other vulnerable groups and proposes a legal 
response.  In so doing, it seeks to begin a conversation about developing a 
cyber civil rights agenda more generally. 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I describes these mobs’ behavior 
and their success in terrorizing victims and suppressing their targets’ speech.  It 
also finds that the online environment offers all the same conditions that social 
psychology research has found to maximize the danger of destructive mob 
behavior. 
 
30 PHILIP DRAY, CAPITOL MEN: THE EPIC STORY OF RECONSTRUCTION THROUGH THE 
LIVES OF THE FIRST BLACK CONGRESSMEN 99 (2008). 
31 More generally, opponents of cyber civil rights raise the supposed perils of even 
modest governmental regulatory involvement with the Internet against initiatives to address 
any cyber civil rights concerns. 
32 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 351 (explaining the U.S. rejection of strict liability as 
partly attributable to the pressing need to encourage material development). 
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Part II lays out the necessary components of a legal response to online 
mobs.  First, cyber civil rights proponents should seek to align the interests of 
dominant online groups with those of online mobs’ victims.  Second, such 
proponents must make an effort to translate longstanding civil rights principles 
from the offline to the online world. 
Part III considers the relationship between cyber civil rights and cyber civil 
liberties.  In particular, it addresses both theoretical and doctrinal concerns 
about limiting online mobs’ attacks, which purport to be protected speech.  It 
shows that, although much obnoxious online activity is and should be 
protected, limiting online mobs’ ability to silence women, people of color, and 
their other targets will, in fact, enhance the most important values underlying 
the First Amendment. 
Finally, Part IV addresses the problems posed by online mobs’ anonymity.  
Whatever causes of action their victims may possess do little good if they 
cannot find and serve their assailants.  Online mobs’ ability to strike with 
impunity results in large part from websites’ practices of opening themselves 
to anonymous posters.  Unfortunately, after a misguided, overzealous early 
case imposed unsustainable strict liability on Internet Service Providers 
(“ISPs”) for material accessed through their facilities, the legal debate has 
veered unproductively into the language of immunity.  This Part instead seeks 
to move the debate to the development of a standard of care that preserves the 
benefits from the Internet’s aggregative and disaggregative functions while 
limiting the opportunities for online mobs and others to harness those awesome 
capabilities for malicious and unlawful ends. 
I. ANONYMOUS MOBS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
The most valuable, indeed generative, opportunity the Internet provides is 
access.33  An individual must establish an online presence and begin to build 
an online reputation before aggregating ideas or economic opportunities with 
others online.  The Internet offers no viable alternatives to connect with others 
if a person is forced off the Internet as compared to the offline world, which 
offers various means of communication even if one route is foreclosed.  And it 
is through access to the online community that anonymous groups come 
together to deny women, people of color, religious minorities, lesbians, and 
gays access. 
The civil rights implications of ISPs charging women or African Americans 
higher monthly fees than men or Caucasians would be obvious.  A less 
obvious, although no less troubling, civil rights problem arises when 
anonymous online groups raise the price vulnerable people have to pay to 
maintain an online presence by forcing them to suffer a destructive 
combination of threats, damaging statements aimed to interfere with their 
employment opportunities, privacy invasions, and denial-of-service attacks 
 
33 See JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET – AND HOW TO STOP IT 79-81 
(2008). 
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because of their gender or race.  Their assaults force vulnerable people offline, 
preventing them from enjoying the economic and social opportunities that 
social networking sites, blogs, and other Web 2.0 platforms provide. 
Section A describes these cyber assaults that imperil, economically harm, 
and silence traditionally disadvantaged people.  Section B shows how the 
online environment magnifies the pathologies driving dangerous group 
behavior, ensuring that the abuse will not correct itself. 
A. The Destructive Nature of Online Mobs 
Online assaults exist along several, interconnected dimensions.34  First, 
attacks involve threats of physical violence.  Death and rape threats are legion 
on the web.35  The threats may foreshadow offline stalking and physical 
violence.36  They often include references to victims’ home addresses and 
personal information, suggesting attackers’ familiarity with them, and the 
attackers encourage readers to physically assault the victims, putting them in 
fear of genuine danger.  Posters also encourage readers to physically assault 
victims, providing the victims’ home address. 
In response, victims stop blogging and participating in online forums. 37  A 
Pew Internet and American Life Project study attributed a nine percent decline 
 
34 A note on methodology is in order.  Discussing material of this kind in an academic 
forum raises difficult ethical questions.  Repeating damaging material for the sake of 
condemning it would be counter-productive and, indeed, hypocritical.  At the same time, the 
sheer brutality of these assaults is an important part of this story.  This Article repeats the 
mobs’ misogynistic and other bigoted rhetoric to the extent necessary to convey the depth of 
their depravity, but beyond that paraphrases.  It excludes the names of all victims that have 
not gone fully public themselves. 
35 See, e.g., Cheryl Lindsey Seelhoff, A Chilling Effect: The Oppression and Silencing of 
Women Journalists and Bloggers Worldwide, OFF OUR BACKS, Summer 2007, at 18, 18 
(describing posters’ threats to kill and rape a female writer on her blog); Valenti, supra note 
5 (describing anonymous posters’ attack of women bloggers with comments such as “I 
would f[**]k them both in the ass” and “hate-f[**]k” them); Posting of Zephoria to 
Apophenia, supra note 13 (providing an account of rape threats on a college computer 
science message board). 
36 Catherine Holahan, The Dark Side of Web Anonymity, BUS. WK., May 12, 2008, at 64,  
64 available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_19/b4083064456431.htm (detailing 
how a young woman had strange men showing up at her home in response to sexual 
comments made about her online). 
37 Barak, supra note 6, at 80; Female Bloggers Face Harassment, WOMEN IN HIGHER 
EDUC., June 1, 2007, at 5, 5 (highlighting that female bloggers are likely to be harassed far 
more than their male counterparts and that such harassment may have led to a decrease in 
female presence in online chat rooms); see Nakashima, supra note 9 (explaining that women 
attacked online by anonymous posters respond by suspending blogging, turning to private 
forums, or using gender-neutral pseudonyms); Elaine Vigneault: Read My Mind, 
http://www.elainevigneault.com/ (Apr. 13, 2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
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in women’s use of chat rooms to menacing sexual comments.38  Victims may 
also make their sites private or assume pseudonyms to mask their identity.39  
As one victim explains, it does not take many rape threats to “make women 
want to lay low.”40 
Second, assaults invade victims’ privacy.  Attackers hack into victims’ 
computers and e-mail accounts to obtain personal information, such as Social 
Security numbers, driver’s license information, and confidential medical 
data.41  The stolen information is then posted online.42  Disclosing such 
personal information poses imminent risks, such as the threat of identity theft, 
employment discrimination, and online or offline stalking.43  It also inflicts 
harm in the longer term.  Victims feel a sustained loss of personal security and 
regularly dismantle their online presence to avoid further devastation of their 
privacy.44 
Third, assaults can involve statements that damage reputations and interfere 
with victims’ economic opportunities.45  Online comments may assert that 
individuals suffer from mental illnesses.46  They may claim individuals have 
sexually transmitted diseases.47  Attackers sometimes publish doctored 
photographs of victims.48  In addition, attackers send damaging statements 
about victims to their employers and manipulate search engines to reproduce 
 
Vigneault, Ignore Violence] (explaining that she assumes male pseudonyms to comment on 
male-dominated blogs). 
38 Female Bloggers Face Harassment, supra note 37, at 5. 
39 Id. 
40 Valenti, supra note 5. 
41 Barak, supra note 6, at 80. 
42 See Pat Miller, Another Rape in Cyberspace, CERISE, Nov. 2007, 
http://cerise.theirisnetwork.org/archives/188. 
43 See Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private 
Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 252-53 (2007) (discussing 
the risk of identity theft posed by the release of Social Security numbers). 
44 Nakashima, supra note 9. 
45 Victims maintain that many of these statements are false.  If indeed that is true, such 
postings may be tortious.  See infra Part III.C.1. (discussing defamation and false light 
claims).  This Article will not attempt to parse the truth of particular charges. 
46 See, e.g., Sandra Sobieraj Westfall et al., Campus Controversy: Has Online Gossip 
Gone Too Far?, PEOPLE, Apr. 14, 2008, at 107 (explaining that anonymous posters on the 
JuicyCampus website asserted that a Duke student attempted suicide, which the student 
claimed was false). 
47 See Richard Morgan, A Crash Course in Online Gossip, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008, at 
ST7; Jessica Bennett, The Flip Side of Internet Fame, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 22, 2008, 
http://www.newsweek.com/id/114535 (describing JuicyCampus as having turned into a 
venue for bigoted rants and stories about identified students’ alleged drug use and sexual 
diseases). 
48 See Valenti, supra note 5. 
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the damaging statements and pictures for others to see,49 creating digital 
“scarlet letters” that destroy reputations.50 
Fourth, some assaults do not involve online postings at all.  Instead, 
attackers use technology to force victims offline.  Groups coordinate denial-of-
service attacks51 and “image reaping” campaigns to shut down sites and 
blogs.52  While the other types of assaults silence victims indirectly with fear 
and humiliation, this fourth type of assault muzzles them directly. 
Groups commonly wield all four of these tools in their attacks against 
individuals.  Some attacks originate online and continue offline, while others 
move in the opposite direction.53  For example, in 2007, the social networking 
site AutoAdmit hosted a pattern of attacks on female law students.54  Thirty-
 
49 See SOLOVE, supra note 4, at 203 (explaining that employers conduct background 
checks by running Google searches which often produce inaccurate information). 
50 Frank Pasquale, Rankings, Reductionism, and Responsibility, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
115, 122 (2006); Adam Hunter, Click Here for Justice?, 
http://tech.msn.com/news/article.aspx?cp-documentid=6247087 (last visited Nov. 2, 2008) 
(“The Puritans had their scarlet letters to shame those accused of wrongdoing; today, we 
have the Internet.”). 
51 Greer, supra note 8; Elaine Vigneault: Read My Mind, 
http://www.elainevigneault.com/ (Aug. 11, 2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Vigneault, Web Harassment].  A denial-of-service attack is conduct that causes a loss in 
service of online resources.  A common form of denial-of-service is a buffer overflow attack 
in which attackers send multiple e-mails, requests for information, or other traffic to the 
server or network address to shut it down.  Catherine E. Smith, Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress: An Old Arrow Targets the New Head of the Hate Hydra, 80 DENV. U. 
L. REV. 1, 4 n.23 (2002).  In November 2001, the FBI reported that extremist groups were 
adopting the power of modern technology and concluded that, although extremist groups’ 
cyberattacks were limited to unsophisticated e-mail bombs and threatening content, the 
increase in technological competency could lead to network-based attacks on the nation’s 
infrastructure such as shutting down government computer systems.  See NAT’L 
INFRASTRUCTURE PROT. CTR., HIGHLIGHTS 2-4 (Linda Garrison & Martin Grand eds., 2001), 
http://www.iwar.org.uk/infocon/nipc-highlights/2001/highlight-01-10.pdf; Brian 
McWilliams, Internet an Ideal Tool for Extremists - FBI, NEWSBYTES, Nov. 16, 2001, 
available at 2001 WLNR 6085044. 
52 “Image reaping” involves the repeated refreshing of a site’s images to use up all of its 
allocated bandwidth.  Vigneault, Web Harassment, supra note 51. 
53 See, e.g., Posting of AmandaBrumfield to BlogHer, 
http://www.blogher.com/node/12104 (Mar. 30, 2007, 11:16) (explaining that she shut down 
her personal blog after a year of being stalked and harassed by a group of people both online 
and offline including calls to her father’s unlisted phone number with threats). 
54 Brittan Heller, Note, Of Legal Rights and Moral Wrongs: A Case Study of Internet 
Defamation, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 279, 285 n.20 (2007) (explaining that targeted female 
law students attended various law schools including Boston University, Harvard, New York 
University, Northwestern, University of Virginia, and Yale). 
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nine posters targeted named students on the site’s message board.55  The 
posters, writing under pseudonyms, generated hundreds of threatening, 
sexually-explicit, and allegedly defamatory comments about the victims.56 
Posters threatened female law students with violence.  One poster asserted 
that a named female student should “be raped.”57  That remark begat dozens of 
more threats.  For instance, a poster promised: “I’ll force myself on [the 
identified student]” and “sodomize” her “repeatedly.”58  Another said the 
student “deserves to be raped so that her little fantasy world can be shattered 
by real life.”59 
Discussion threads suggested the posters had physical access to the female 
students.  A poster described a student’s recent attire at the law school gym.60  
Posts mentioned meeting targeted women and described what they looked like 
and where they spent their summer.61  Posters urged site members to follow a 
woman to the gym, take her picture, and post it on AutoAdmit.62  Others 
provided updates on sightings of a particular woman.63  Another poster 
 
55 Posting of Amir Efrati to Wall Street Journal Law Blog, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/01/30/subpoena-allowed-in-autoadmit-suit (Jan. 30, 2008, 
9:08 EST). 
56 Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Opposition to John Doe 21’s Motion to 
Quash Plaintiff’s Subpoena at 6, Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249 (D. Conn. 2008) 
(No. 3:07CV00909) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law] (explaining that 
AutoAdmit members posted over 200 threads about named female law students). 
57 First Amended Complaint ¶ 49, Doe I, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249 (No. 307CV00909) 
[hereinafter First Amended Complaint]; Letter from John Doe 21, a.k.a. “AK47” to 
Plaintiffs, reprinted in Declaration of Steve Mitra in Support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition to 
John Doe 21’s Motion to Quash Plaintiffs’ Subpoena exhibit 4, at 2, Doe I, 561 F. Supp 2d 
249 (No. 307CV00909) (admitting that the author posted a comment that plaintiff “should 
be raped”). 
58 First Amended Complaint, supra note 57, ¶ 21. 
59 Id. ¶ 23.  Similarly, two female bloggers received e-mails from anonymous individuals 
threatening sexual violence and faced in-person harassment after resigning from John 
Edwards’ presidential campaign in 2007.  Posting of Amanda Marcotte to Pandagon, 
http://pandagon.blogsome.com/2007/02/13/people-who-claim-to-love-jesus-write-me/ (Feb. 
13, 2007); Posting of Paul the Spud to Shakesville, 
http://www.shakespearessister.blogspot.com/2007/03/this-needs-to-stop.html (Mar. 27, 
2007) (describing individuals “blocking [a female blogger’s] driveway and pounding on her 
door”). 
60 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law, supra note 56, at 4. 
61 Jill Filipovic, Note, Blogging While Female: How Internet Misogyny Parallels “Real-
World” Harassment, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 295, 295 (2007). 
62 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law, supra note 56, at 4. 
63 Filipovic, supra note 61, at 296 (explaining that AutoAdmit posters described 
sightings of the author alongside comments that she should be “hate f[**]k[ed]” and 
“kick[ed in] the box”). 
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provided the e-mail address of a female law student under a thread entitled 
“Mad at [named individual]?  E-mail her . . . .”64 
Posters also asserted damaging statements about the women.  One asserted 
that a female student spent time in a drug rehabilitation center.65  Another 
claimed the student had a lesbian affair with a law school administrator.66  
Others remarked that the student appeared in Playboy.67  Posters claimed that 
another female student had a sexually transmitted disease.68  Others provided 
her purported “sub-par” LSAT score.69  The victims asserted that these were 
lies.70 
In addition to publishing the alleged lies online, posters spread them offline 
to undermine the victims’ job opportunities.  One poster urged the group to tell 
top law firms about the female student’s LSAT score “before she gets an 
offer.”71  Posters e-mailed their attacks to the student’s former employer, 
recommending that the employer show it to its clients, who would “not want to 
be represented by someone who is not of the highest character value.”72 
Another poster sent an e-mail to a particular female law student’s faculty 
asserting that her father had a criminal record.73  The poster displayed the e-
mail on AutoAdmit before sending it, explaining: “I’ve assembled a 
spreadsheet with [the faculty e-mail] addresses and every single one of them 
will be notified about what our darling [named student] has done.  I post this 
here as a warning to all those who would try to regulate the more antisocial 
posters – we have the power now.”74 
 
64 First Amended Complaint, supra note 57, ¶ 63. 
65 Id. ¶ 54.  Similarly, two female bloggers received e-mails from anonymous individuals 
threatening sexual violence and faced in-person harassment after resigning from John 
Edwards’ presidential campaign in 2007.  Posting of Amanda Marcotte to Pandagon, 
http://pandagon.blogsome.com/2007/02/13/people-who-claim-to-love-jesus-write-me/ (Feb. 
13, 2007); Posting of Paul the Spud to Shakesville, 
http://www.shakespearessister.blogspot.com/2007/03/this-needs-to-stop.html (Mar. 27, 
2007) (describing individuals “blocking [a female blogger’s] driveway and pounding on her 
door”). 
66 Id. ¶ 27. 
67 Id. ¶ 51. 
68 Id. ¶ 21. 
69 Id. ¶¶ 26, 28, 30. 
70 Id. ¶¶ 32, 52-54, 79-82.  Whether the assertions are indeed false statements is raised by 
the plaintiffs’ lawsuit against the thirty-nine AutoAdmit posters.  See Heller, supra note 54, 
at 280 (explaining that the “ludicrous allegations” made against one of the victims included 
false accusations that she “bribed [her] way into Yale with an ‘embarrassingly low amount’ 
of money” and “pretend[ed] to be either African-American or Native-American”). 
71 First Amended Complaint, supra note 57, ¶ 30. 
72 Id. ¶ 61. 
73 Id. ¶ 58. 
74 Id. ¶ 59. 
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Site members applauded the e-mail and rallied around the sender.  For 
instance, a poster stated that the e-mail sender should be awarded a 
“Congressional medal.”75  Others recommended sending the e-mail from a 
public PC and a “hushmail account” or with anonymizing software.76 
The attackers waged a “Google-bombing” campaign that would ensure the 
prominence of offensive threads in searches of the female students’ names.77  
Posters made plain the goal of their Google-bombing campaign: “We’re not 
going to let that bitch have her own blog be the first result from googling her 
name!”78  An individual writing under the pseudonym “leaf” detailed the steps 
AutoAdmit posters would have to take to engage in Google-bombing.79  Leaf 
explained that posts should include the adjective “big-titted” next to the 
woman’s name.80  “Big-titted [name of female student]’s name is never to be 
used in parts – it must always be [name of student] at the least, and ‘big-titted 
[name of the student]’ ideally” with pictures of her accompanying the thread.81  
This would work because search engine algorithms assign a high rank to a web 
page if sites linking to that page use consistent anchor text.82 
Posters admitted their desire to intimidate and harm the female students.  
After one of the women did not get a summer job, a poster asked if the other 
“bitch got what she deserved too?”83  Another said: “I’m doing cartwheels 
 
75 Posting of Bodhi Tree Miracle to AutoAdmit, http://www.autoadmit.com/ (Mar. 9, 
2007, 14:34) (on file with author). 
76 Posting of atlas (flae) to AutoAdmit, http://www.autoadmit.com/ (Mar. 9, 2007, 15:45) 
(on file with author). 
77 See First Amended Complaint, supra note 57, ¶ 17. 
78 Posting of STANFORDtroll to AutoAdmit, http://www.autoadmit.com/ (Mar. 9, 2007, 
12:39) (on file with author). 
79 First Amended Complaint, supra note 57, ¶ 43. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 See Tom McNichol, Your Message Here, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2004, at G1; Tom 
Zeller, Jr., A New Campaign Tactic: Manipulating Google Data, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2006, 
at A20.  Previously, Google asserted it has little or no control over the practice of Google-
bombing and would not individually edit search results due to the fact that a bomb occurred.  
Posting of Marissa Mayer, Director of Consumer Web Products to The Official Google 
Blog, http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2005/09/googlebombing-failure.html (Sept. 16, 2005, 
12:54).  On January 27, 2007, Google announced on its official Google Webmaster Central 
Blog that it now had an “algorithm that minimizes the impact of many Googlebombs.”  
Posting of Ryan Moulton & Kendra Carattini to The Official Google Webmaster Central 
Blog, http://googlewebmastercentral.blogspot.com/2007/01/quick-word-about-
googlebombs.html (Jan. 25, 2007, 16:16). 
83 Posting of STANFORDtroll to AutoAdmit, http://www.autoadmit.com/ (Mar. 9, 2007, 
12:42) (on file with author). 
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knowing this stupid Jew bitch is getting her self esteem raped.”84  A poster 
explained that the women were targeted “just for being women.”85 
A lawsuit filed by two of the women alleged the AutoAdmit site managers 
refused to remove the offensive threads even though the women told them that 
the messages caused them severe emotional distress.86  On March 15, 2007, a 
site manager asserted that he would not remove the offensive threads until the 
female students apologized for threatening litigation and until 
ReputationDefender, a group assisting the women, acknowledged the mistakes 
the manager alleged the group had made.87 
In a similar vein, a group called Anonymous has devoted itself to terrorizing 
and silencing hundreds of women writing on the Web.88  For instance, in 2007, 
Anonymous used message boards and wikis to plan an attack on a nineteen-
year-old woman who maintained a video blog about Japanese language and 
video games.89  Group members hacked her online accounts, including her 
YouTube blog account, e-mail, Facebook profile, and MySpace page, to obtain 
 
84 First Amended Complaint, supra note 57, ¶ 42. 
85 Posting of roffles roffles to AutoAdmit, http://www.autoadmit.com/ (Mar. 11, 2007, 
21:50) (on file with author). 
86 First Amended Complaint, supra note 57, ¶ 15.  The former Chief Education Director 
of AutoAdmit filed a libel suit against two female law students, their counsel, and 
ReputationDefender, in which he disputed the students’ claim that he refused their requests 
to take down the offensive threads.  Complaint ¶¶ 30, 33, Ciolli v. Iravani, No. 
2:08CV02601, 2008 WL 4412053 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (alleging that “Mr. Ciolli never told 
[defendant] that any postings about her would not be removed” and that he responded to a 
complaint sent by the defendant with a message that she should direct her concerns to site 
owner Jarret Cohen). 
87 Jarret Cohen, AutoAdmit’s Challenge to Reputation Defender (Mar. 15, 2007), 
http://www.autoadmit.com/challenge.to.reputation.defender.html.  Cohen said that one of 
the identified women contacted him to remove offensive messages about her, but he ignored 
her request because she threatened to sue him.  Mary E. O’Leary, Open Website Hurts: Yale 
Group Stands up Against Offensive Content, NEW HAVEN REG., Apr. 1, 2007.  Cohen also 
asserted that he dismissed another similar complaint “because it sounded like more of the 
kind of juvenile stuff that I have heard going on that people complained about for years.”  
Id. (quoting Jarret Cohen). 
88 Unidentified individuals began Anonymous in 2003.  The group has gathered its 
members on online image boards, such as 4chan.org.  Chris Landers, Serious Business: 
Anonymous Takes on Scientology, CITY PAPER (Balt.), Apr. 2, 2008, at 14.  As of April 
2008, 4chan.org is the fifty-sixth most popular website in the United States.  Id.  A 2006 
news special on Fox’s Los Angeles affiliate gave Anonymous some notoriety by featuring 
the group in a story, which described the group as “hackers on steroids” and an “internet 
hate machine.”  Id.; see FOX 11 Investigates: ‘Anonymous’ (FOX 11 news broadcast July 
26, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DNO6G4ApJQY. 
89 Miller, supra note 42.  The woman maintained her video blog under the name 
Applemilk1988.  Id.  Before the attacks, the woman’s blog garnered broad attention, making 
it onto YouTube’s Most Subscribed list.  Id.  A wiki is a webpage designed so that any user 
may modify or add to its content. 
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her personal information.90  They published her account passwords and private 
medical history on various sites.91  Postings disclosed her full name, home 
address, and her mother’s e-mail address.92  Group members sent messages 
from the woman’s e-mail account to her loved ones.93  They claimed the 
woman had committed suicide on various message boards.94 
Members of Anonymous posted doctored photographs of the woman 
including one picture that featured the woman’s head atop naked bodies.95  
Next to her picture appeared the promise that group members would rape her 
“at full force in her vagina, mouth, and ass.”96  A drawing depicted men 
brutally raping the woman.97 
Anonymous urged its members to “seek and destroy” the woman’s online 
identity.98  Group members saturated her video blog with sexually violent 
material.99  They took down her videos.100  Anonymous updated its members 
on the status of her sites.101  When her live journal or video blog reappeared, 
Anonymous urged members to “rape” and “nuke[] [her sites] from orbit.”102 
Anonymous similarly attacked a journalist writing under the pseudonym 
“Heart” who maintained a blog and discussion forum about women’s issues.103  
Group members pieced together her identity from her postings and revealed 
her name and home address on her discussion forum.104  They made death 
threats and sexually menacing comments on her blog.105  Anonymous urged 
 
90 Id.; see Encyclopedia Dramatica, Applemilk1988, 
http://www.encyclopediadramatica.com/Applemilk1988 (last visited Nov. 2, 2008) 
[hereinafter Applemilk1988]. 
91 Applemilk1988, supra note 90; Miller, supra note 42. 
92 See Applemilk1988, supra note 90; Insurgency Wiki, Applemilk, 
http://partyvan.info/index.php?title=Applemilk (last visited Nov. 2, 2008). 
93 Miller, supra note 42. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Applemilk1988, supra note 90. 
99 Miller, supra note 42. 
100 Applemilk1988, supra note 90. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Posting of Heart to Women’s Space, 
http://womensspace.wordpress.com/2007/08/06/blogging-while-female-men-win-hacking-
as-sexual-terrorism/ (Aug. 6, 2007) [hereinafter Heart]. 
104 Greer, supra note 8. 
105 A poster wrote: “I’d like to tie you down, take a knife, and slit your throat.  I’d 
penetrate you over and over in all orifices, and create some of my own to stick myself in.”  
Posting of Heart to Women’s Space, Blogging While Female – Warning May Trigger, 
http://womensspace.wordpress.com/2007/08/04/blogging-while-female-warning-may-
trigger/ (Aug. 4, 2007). 
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members to engage in “image reaping” to shut down her site.106  The group 
succeeded in overloading and closing Heart’s website during the summer of 
2007.107  In August 2007, Heart closed her blog and website.108 
Anonymous maintains a list of sites and blogs addressing women’s issues 
that it claims to have forced offline.109  The list includes the names of shuttered 
sites with a line crossed through them and the accompanying message: “Down 
due to excessive bandwidth – great success!”110  When a site reappears online, 
Anonymous tells its members: “It’s back!  Show no mercy.”111  The group 
takes credit for closing over 100 feminist sites and blogs.112  Anonymous has 
also targeted journalists, such as Anna Greer, who have reported on the 
group’s attacks.  The group published Ms. Greer’s home and e-mail addresses 
with instructions to “choke a bitch.”113 
Targeted female bloggers and website operators confirm the group’s claims 
of attacks.114  They describe the denial-of-service attacks and “image reaping” 
campaigns that have shut down their sites.115  A victim explained: “Being 
silenced for over two weeks felt infuriating, stifling, imprisoned by gang 
raepists [sic] just waiting for me to try to get up from underneath their weight 
 
106 Heart, supra note 103. 
107 Id.  ISPs provide the websites they host with monthly bandwith allocations.  When a 
site uses up its monthly allowance, the ISP will shut down the site until the following month 
or charge the website owner additional fees.  ISPs have a variety of hosting plans and 
usually charge monthly rates.  See, e.g., HostDime, Shared Website Hosting Services and 
Plans, http://www.hostdime.com/services/shared/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2008). 
108 Heart, supra note 103. 
109 See Encyclopedia Dramatica, Cheryl Lindsey Seelhoff, 
http://www.encyclopediadramatica.com/Cheryl_Lindsey_Seelhoff (last visited Nov. 2, 
2008) [hereinafter Seelhoff]. 
110 Seelhoff, supra note 109. 
111 Id. 
112 Posting of Jill to Feministe, http://www.feministe.us/blog/archives/2007/08/09/what-
do-we-do-about-online-harassment/ (Aug. 9, 2007, 22:36). 
113 Insurgency Wiki, Anna Greer, http://partyvan.info/index.php?title=Anna_Greer (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2008). 
114 Posting of Kevin to A Slant Truth,  http://slanttruth.com/2007/08/15/feminist-
bloggers-are-under-increasing-levels-of-attack/ (Aug. 15, 2007, 20:15 EST) (explaining that 
feminist blogs including Feministe, Shakesville, Women’s Space, and Biting Beaver were 
subjected to denial-of-service attacks).  For instance, freesoil.org was shut down due to 
excess bandwidth.  Posting of Aletha to Women’s Space, 
http://womensspace.wordpress.com/2007/08/06/blogging-while-female-men-win-hacking-
as-sexual-terrorism/#comment-47470 (Aug. 7, 2007, 7:20 EST).  Freesoil.org’s web access 
log showed evidence of a denial-of-service attack.  Posting of Aletha to Free Soil Party 
Blog, http://freesoil.org/wordpress/?p=221 (Sept. 18, 2007, 1:41 EST) [hereinafter Aletha – 
Free Soil Party Blog].  In addition, “Newwaveradfem” explained that her blog was attacked 
in August 2007.  New Wave Radical Blog, http://newwaveradfem.wordpress.com/?s=attack 
(Aug. 4, 2007, 14:40). 
115 Vigneault, Ignore Violence, supra note 37. 
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so they could stomp me down again.”116  Victimized website operators and 
bloggers have asked the group Anonymous in vain to stop its attacks.117 
Groups attack women on the website JuicyCampus with threats of violence, 
and their posts have generated offline stalking.118  For instance, anonymous 
posters disclosed a woman’s cell phone and dorm address with instructions that 
she was available for sex.119  After the posts appeared, strange men started 
knocking on the woman’s door at night.120 
Online mobs have targeted African-American and Hispanic women.121  As 
blogger “La Chola” explains, women-of-color bloggers have consistently 
received horrific, vile e-mails and comments threatening violent sexual assault, 
death, and attacks against family members.122  After the author of the blog 
“Ask This Black Woman” posted commentary about the Resident Evil 5 video 
game, anonymous posters attacked her on her blog and other sites.123  She 
received death threats.124  Posters told her to “[g]et back into the cotton fields, 
you filthy [n****r]”125 and threatened to overrun her blog.126 
Posters on a white supremacist website targeted Bonnie Jouhari, the mother 
of a biracial girl.127  The site posted an image of Jouhari’s workplace burning 
in flames with a caption that read “race traitor . . . beware, for in our day, they 
will be hung from the neck from the nearest tree or lamp post.”128  The site 
included a picture of Jouhari’s child and an image of her burning office with 
bomb-making instructions posted beneath it.129  Ms. Jouhari and her daughter 
received harassing phone calls at home and at work.130 
 
116 Aletha - Free Soil Party Blog, supra note 114. 
117 See, e.g., id. 
118 Larry Magid, Opinion, JuicyCampus is a Haven for Cyberbullies, SAN JOSE MERCURY 
NEWS, Mar. 24, 2008, https://www.reputationdefender.com/viewPress?press_id=253. 
119 Holahan, supra note 36, at 64; Magid, supra note 118. 
120 Holahan, supra note 36, at 64. 
121 Posting of La Chola to La Alma de Fuego, http://brownfemipower.com/?p=1224 
(Apr. 13, 2007, 11:15. 
122 Id. 
123 Posting of Sokari to Black Looks, 
http://www.blacklooks.org/2007/08/where_lies_the_resident_evil.html (Aug. 1, 2007). 
124 Ask This Black Woman, http://askthisblackwoman.com/2007/10/01/death-threat.aspx 
(Oct. 1, 2007, 15:20). 
125 Ask This Black Woman, http://askthisblackwoman.com/2007/08/01/more-on-
resident-evil-5.aspx (Aug. 1, 2007, 11:52). 
126 Vigneault, Ignore Violence, supra note 37. 
127 Wilson, No. 03-98-0692-8, 2000 WL 988268, at *4 (Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. 
July 19, 2000). 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at *4, *6. 
130 Id. at *7. 
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Other people of color have faced similar attacks.131  An Asian-American 
columnist who writes a blog called “Yellow Peril” explained that a group of 
individuals attacked her online after she wrote about a hate crimes march.132  
The group posted a picture of her on a white supremacist watch list, which 
included her phone number and address, and its members sent threatening e-
mails to her.133  College students wrote racially threatening messages on a 
Hispanic student’s Facebook profile,134 promising to “come find you and drag 
you behind my (expletive) car.”135 
Online mobs target individuals from religious minorities as well.  Groups 
post anti-Semitic comments alongside damaging statements about specific 
Jewish individuals on the website JuicyCampus.136  The group Anonymous has 
targeted the Church of Scientology.137  It posted videos on YouTube 
announcing its intent to destroy the Church.138  Anonymous calls its campaign 
 
131 See, e.g., MinJungKim.com Braindump v. 6.0, 
http://minjungkim.com/2007/03/26/it%e2%80%99s-awful-yes/ (Mar. 26, 2007, 17:00 EST) 
(describing one Asian-American woman’s experience with threatening e-mails, racist online 
comments, and instant message harassment). 
132 Washington Baltimore and Annapolis Blog, http://www.crablaw.com/2007/04/take-
back-blog-host-page.html. 
133 Id.  Similarly, a woman who maintained a blog about Persian culture reported that her 
site was hacked and that individuals posted pornographic pictures and her home address on 
the site.  Posting of Lady Sun to Women’s Space, 
http://womensspace.wordpress.com/2007/08/06/blogging-while-female-men-win-hacking-
as-sexual-terrorism/#comment-48188 (Aug. 9, 2007, 5:05). 
134 Christine Reid, Lawyer: O’Neal Not Responsible, BOULDER DAILY CAMERA, Feb. 28, 
2006, at A1. 
135 Vincent Carroll, Editorial, On Point: Blurring the Line, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, June 6, 
2006, at 34A.  In 1996, Richard Machado, a former student at the University of California at 
Irvine, sent anonymous messages signed “Asian Hater” to fifty-nine Asian students.  
ComputingCases.org, Machado Case History, 
http://computingcases.org/case_materials/machado/case_history/case_history.html (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2008).  In the message, the student warned that he would “personally . . . 
find and kill” his target.  Id.  Machado was convicted of two counts of federal civil rights 
violations.  Id. 
136 California Middle-Schoolers Suspended for Viewing MySpace Posting with Alleged 
Threat, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 2, 2006, 
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/nation/20060302-1140-myspace-suspensions.html 
(reporting that twenty middle school students were suspended for two days after viewing a 
boy’s posting that contained anti-Semitic remarks and threats against another student). 
137 See Landers, supra note 88 (quoting a statement by Anonymous that it intends to 
“expel” the Church of Scientology from the Internet and “systematically dismantle” the 
religious group); Posting by Ryan Singel to Wired Blog Network, 
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/01/anonymous-hacke.html (Jan. 25, 2008, 18:39) 
(describing an attack by Anonymous, intended for a Scientology website, that instead 
attacked the website of a school in the Netherlands). 
138 Landers, supra note 88. 
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against the religious organization “Project Chanology.”139  Group members 
have engaged in denial-of-service attacks to take down the scientology.org 
website.140  Nine hundred Anonymous members gathered in a chat room to 
discuss different ways to harass the Church.141  Some suggested making 
harassing phone calls to the Church’s local branches.142 
Online groups have attacked gays and lesbians.143  Anonymous has declared 
homosexuals as the group’s enemy.144  It urges members to shut down blogs 
and websites of targeted men and women.145  Anonymous takes credit for 
driving “Gay Diamond,” a lesbian, off YouTube.146  Anonymous accuses 
victims of having sexually transmitted diseases.147  Postings reveal targeted 
individuals’ home addresses, phone numbers, and other personal 
information.148  In August 2007, denial-of-service attacks shut down a gay-
gaming site and the site’s owners received death threats.149 
The harm online mobs inflict is potent.  The threats and privacy intrusions 
produce damage in numerous ways.  Publishing a woman’s home address 
alongside the suggestion that she should be raped or is interested in sex raises 
the risk that readers of the post will stalk her or commit physical violence 
against her.  Posting a person’s Social Security number increases the chance 
that she will be subject to identity theft.  Victims fear that threats or identity 
theft will be realized: the Internet’s anonymity disaggregates the threats from 
their social context, eliminating cues that might signal the extent of peril.  
Online anonymity also may prevent an effective law enforcement response.  A 
 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 E.g., Aletha - Free Soil Party Blog, supra note 114. 
144 See, e.g., Encyclopedia Dramatica, Chris Crocker, 
http://www.encyclopediadramatica.com/Chris_Crocker (last visitied Nov. 5, 2008) 
[herinafter Chris Crocker] (espousing hate for Chris Crocker, a gay man who gained fame 
on YouTube for a video he posted which depicted him crying and urging the public to leave 
Britney Spears alone). 
145 See Encyclopedia Dramatica, Mrfetch, 
http://encyclopediadramatica.com/index.php?title=Mrfetch&printable=yes (last visited Nov. 
24, 2008) [hereinafter Mrfetch]; Insurgency Wiki, Keith Kurson, 
http://partyvan.info/index.php?title=Keith_Kurson (last visited Nov. 5, 2008) [hereinafter 
Keith Kurson]. 
146 See Mrfetch, supra note 145. 
147 See Chris Crocker, supra note 144. 
148 Keith Kurson, supra note 145. 
149 Posting of Brian Crecente to Kotaku, http://kotaku.com/gaming/crime/gaygamer-
target-of-hate-crime-286127.php (Aug. 5, 2007, 11:32). 
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victim’s feeling that she is “being watched” also may stifle her creativity and 
sense of well-being.150 
Victims may lose job opportunities due to damaging statements and threats 
posted online.  Employers often review Google search results before 
interviewing and hiring candidates.151  The damaging statements and threats 
may raise doubts about the victim’s competence, or suggest the victim attracts 
unwanted controversy, causing the employer to hire someone else.  When 
victims stop blogging because of threats, they lose opportunities to establish 
their online presence in a manner that could enhance their careers and attract 
clients.152 
If online groups select victims for abuse based on their race, ethnicity, 
gender, or religion, they perpetrate invidious discrimination.  Important 
parallels exist between the harm inflicted by prior centuries’ mobs and this 
century’s destructive online crowds.  Much like their offline counterparts, 
online hate mobs deprive vulnerable individuals of their equal right to 
participate in economic, political, and social life.  They silence victims and 
stifle public discourse.153  Although online mobs do not engage in lynching and 
physical beatings, their attacks produce serious individual and societal harm 
that cannot be ignored. 
B. The Dynamics of Mob Behavior 
These destructive crowds continue a disturbing pattern from the past, when 
anonymous groups such as the anti-immigrant mobs of the nineteenth century 
and the Ku Klux Klan inflicted serious harm on their victims.154  Social 
scientists have identified four factors that influence the potential dangerousness 
of a group.155 
First, groups with homogeneous views tend to become more extreme when 
they deliberate.156  Group members’ interactions tend to reinforce preexisting 
views as members offer a disproportionately large number of arguments 
 
150 See Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as 
Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1426 (2000). 
151 See Pasquale, supra note 50, at 127. 
152 Penelope Trunk’s Brazen Careerist, http://blog.penelopetrunk.com/2007/07/19/blog-
under-your-real-name-and-ignore-the-harassment/ (July 19, 2007) (explaining that women 
who write under pseudonyms miss opportunities associated with blogging under their real 
names, such as networking opportunities and expertise associated with the author’s name). 
153 See OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 15-16 (1996) (discussing the silencing 
affect of hate speech). 
154 See generally SHERRILYN A. IFILL, ON THE COURTHOUSE LAWN: CONFRONTING THE 
LEGACY OF LYNCHING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2007) (discussing the history of 
lynching and mob behavior in America). 
155 See, e.g., J.S. MCCLELLAND, THE CROWD AND THE MOB: FROM PLATO TO CANETTI 
196-97 (1989). 
156 See ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE SECOND EDITION 200-06, 222 (1986). 
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supporting their views and only a small number of arguments tilting the other 
way.157  Hearing agreement from others bolsters group members’ confidence, 
entrenching and radicalizing their views.158 
Second, a group member’s deindividuation encourages the member to act on 
destructive impulses.159  According to one school of thought, people in groups 
fail to see themselves as distinct individuals and lose a sense of personal 
responsibility for their destructive acts.160  Another school of thought attributes 
deindividuation to anonymity rather than an individual’s immersion in a group.  
This account explains that people behave aggressively when they believe that 
they cannot be observed and caught.161 
Third, groups are more destructive when they dehumanize their victims.162  
By viewing victims as devoid of humanity and personal identity, group 
 
157 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0, at 64-67 (2007). 
158 See JOHN C. TURNER ET AL., REDISCOVERING THE SOCIAL GROUP: A SELF-
CATEGORIZATION THEORY 142 (1987). 
159 See Ed Diener, Deindividuation: The Absence of Self-Awareness and Self-Regulation 
in Group Members, in PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUP INFLUENCE 209, 218 (Paul B. Paulus ed., 
1980). 
160 See GUSTAVE LE BON, THE CROWD: A STUDY OF THE POPULAR MIND 26 (1896); Brian 
Mullen, Operationalizing the Effect of the Group on the Individual: A Self-Attention 
Perspective, 19 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 295, 295 (1983); Tom Postmes & Russell 
Spears, Deindividuation and Antinormative Behavior: A Meta-Analysis, 123 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 238, 254 (1998). 
161 ARNOLD P. GOLDSTEIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUP AGGRESSION 32 (2002); RALPH 
H. TURNER & LEWIS M. KILLIAN, COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR 165, 408 (2d ed. 1972); PHILIP G. 
ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: UNDERSTANDING HOW GOOD PEOPLE TURN EVIL 25 
(2007).  This insight naturally accords with deterrence theory.  Studies show heightened 
aggression in subjects who feel anonymous.  The Zimbardo study asked participants to 
administer electric shocks to their subjects.  Philip G. Zimbardo, The Human Choice: 
Individuation, Reason, and Order Versus Deindividuation, Impulse, and Chaos, in 
NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION 237, 266-70 (W.J. Arnold & David Levin eds., 
1969).  Some participants wore oversized lab coats and hoods while others wore normal 
attire.  Id. at 264.  The hooded participants shocked their subjects longer than the 
identifiable participants did.  Id. at 268; see also Evan R. Harrington, The Social Psychology 
of Hatred, 3 J. HATE STUD. 49, 60-61 (2005) (describing a study where participants dressed 
in Ku Klux Klan-type outfits gave greater shocks than participants dressed in nurse outfits).  
Thus, groups are more vicious when they believe their victims cannot retaliate against them.  
See Tizra Leader, Brian Mullen & Dominic Abrams, Without Mercy: The Immediate Impact 
of Group Size on Lynch Mob Atrocity, 33 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1340, 1342 
(2007). 
162 Zimbardo, supra note 161, at 296 (explaining how Nazis dehumanized the Jews 
during the Holocaust); see Roberta Senechal de la Roche, The Sociogenesis of Lynching, in 
UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH: LYNCHING IN THE SOUTH 48, 55-56 (W. Fitzhugh Brundage ed., 
1997) (explaining that lynching incidents were more prevalent and violent when the victim 
was a stranger to the community). 
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members feel free to attack without regret.163  Groups rarely target those who 
are important to their personal well-being.164  For instance, the incidence of 
lynching in the South similarly tracked the degree of interdependence between 
victims and the violent crowd, with black newcomers more vulnerable to 
violence than black employees who worked for the white community.165 
Lastly, group members are more aggressive if they sense that authority 
figures support their efforts.  Social scientists emphasize a perceived leader’s 
role in accelerating dangerous group behavior.166  As recently as the early 
1900s, Southern newspapers explicitly “legitimated mob violence” by 
reporting that lynch mobs included prominent members of the white 
community.167  As legal historian Robert Kaczorowski explains, federal 
authorities implicitly encouraged the Klan by failing to enforce civil rights 
laws.168 
The Internet magnifies the dangerousness of group behavior in each of these 
respects.  Web 2.0 platforms create a feeling of closeness among like-minded 
individuals.169  Online groups affirm each other’s negative views, which 
become more extreme and destructive.170  Individuals say and do things online 
they would never consider saying or doing offline because they feel 
anonymous, even if they write under their real names.171  Because group 
 
163 Senechal de la Roche, supra note 162, at 55-56. 
164 Roberta Senechal de la Roche, Collective Violence as Social Control, 11 SOC. F. 97, 
106-07 (1996). 
165 Id.; see W. FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING IN THE NEW SOUTH: GEORGIA AND 
VIRGINIA, 1880-1930, at 81-82 (1993) (describing how whites feared that black floaters 
“posed a continual threat to white women and children”). 
166 David R. Mandel, Evil and the Instigation of Collective Violence, 2002 ANALYSES 
SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 101, 102. 
167 STEWART E. TOLNAY & E.M. BECK, A FESTIVAL OF VIOLENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF 
SOUTHERN LYNCHINGS, 1882-1930, at 25-27 (1995). 
168 ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL 
COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876, at 66 (2005). 
169 See PATRICIA WALLACE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE INTERNET 79 (1999); Katelyn Y.A. 
McKenna & Amie S. Green, Virtual Group Dynamics, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS 116, 116, 120 
(2002). 
170 WALLACE, supra note 169, at 79. 
171 Id. at 125 (reporting a study in which anonymous Internet conferencing groups 
experienced six times as many uninhibited hostile remarks as non-anonymous groups); 
Russell Spears et al., De-individuation and Group Polarization in Computer-Mediated 
Communication, 29 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 121, 122-24 (1990) (reviewing research that 
attempts to explain the “risky shift effect,” in which group discussions veer toward extreme 
positions, as a product of visual anonymity).  Computer-mediated interactions inevitably 
engender feelings of anonymity.  ADAM N. JOINSON, UNDERSTANDING THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
INTERNET BEHAVIOUR: VIRTUAL WORLDS, REAL LIVES 23 (2003).  Such communications are 
conducted in a state of visual anonymity as users cannot see those with whom they are 
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members often shroud themselves in pseudonyms, they have little fear that 
victims will retaliate against them or that they will suffer social stigma for their 
abusive conduct.  Online groups also perceive their victims as “images” and 
thus feel free to do anything they want to them.172 
Moreover, site operators who refuse to dismantle damaging posts reinforce, 
and effectively encourage, negative behavior.173  Their refusal can stem from a 
libertarian “You Own Your Own Words” philosophy174 or irresponsibility, 
bred from the belief they enjoy broad statutory immunity from liability.175  
Negative posts that remain online constitute “calls to action” that generate 
others in a “snowball effect.”176 
II. THE COMPONENTS OF CYBER CIVIL RIGHTS STRATEGY 
Because destructive online mobs are unlikely to correct themselves, a 
comprehensive legal response is essential to deter and redress the harm they 
cause.177  Much like its forebears, a cyber civil rights agenda must begin with 
the courts, because legislatures and executives have yet to respond to abusive 
online mobs in a comprehensive manner.178  Professor Derrick Bell has 
 
communicating.  Id.  Even if users see an individual’s e-mail address, name, or familiar 
pseudonym, such “identifiability” is not equivalent to meeting someone in person.  Id. 
172 Teresa Wiltz, Cyberspace Shields Hateful Bloggers, J. GAZETTE (Fort Wayne), Nov. 
17, 2007, at 2D, available at 
http://www.journalgazette.net/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20071117?ENT/711170381&te 
(quoting John Perry Barlow). 
173 SOLOVE, supra note 4, at 159. 
174 For instance, Chris Locke, the operator of the sites involved in the Kathy Sierra 
attacks, explained that he initially did not take down the posts about Ms. Sierra due to his 
libertarian philosophy.  Jim Turner, supra note 18. 
175 SOLOVE, supra note 4, at 159 (claiming that 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000) encourages 
irresponsible online behavior by too broadly immunizing bloggers from liability for user-
posted content). 
176 Amanda Paulson, Internet Bullying, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 23, 2003, at 11; 
Dahlia Lithwick, Fear of Blogging: Why Women Shouldn’t Apologize for Being Afraid of 
Threats on the Web, SLATE, May 4, 2007, 
http://www.slate.com/toolbar.aspx?action=print&id=2165654 (suggesting that online threats 
combined with postings of the victim’s home address and Social Security number provide 
incitement to deranged third parties); see High-Tech Bullying is Sweeping the Nation, KENT 
& SUSSEX COURIER (U.K.), Sept. 8, 2006, at 10 (describing the snowball effect of harassing 
message board posts and mobile phone texts that escalate bullying and threats aimed at 
victims). 
177 See SOLOVE, supra note 4, at 190 (discussing how a libertarian approach to address 
online attacks on reputation is unacceptable given the threat to privacy caused by the 
increasing spread of online information and the unlikelihood of market correction). 
178 See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL 
JUSTICE 59 (1987) [hereinafter BELL, WE ARE NOT SAVED] (explaining that because 
legislatures and executives were unresponsive to civil rights issues, groups fighting for 
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counseled that civil rights progress is most likely to occur when the interests of 
vulnerable people can be aligned with those of the dominant group.179  Section 
A heeds that advice, demonstrating that society as a whole suffers much due to 
online attacks and proposing remedies under criminal statutes and general tort 
doctrines. 
On the other hand, online attacks are fundamentally civil rights violations 
and, in many respects, mirror activities that prompted enactment of prior 
centuries’ civil rights laws.  Accordingly, Section B shows how civil rights 
laws fill critical gaps left by traditional tort and criminal law in combating the 
individual and societal harm that online mobs inflict. 
A. Converging the Interests of the Majority with Those of Subjugated Groups 
1. Broader Societal Harm Wrought by Online Mobs 
Although online mobs typically focus on women, people of color, and other 
traditionally subjugated groups, they harm society at large.  When mobs 
succeed in their professed goal of driving bloggers offline, or of using online 
attacks to silence their victims’ offline speech, they impoverish the dialogue 
society depends upon for purposes great and small.  The attacks on Kathy 
Sierra deprived society of an apparently talented and enthusiastic blogger on 
software design.180 
The proliferation of sexual threats and violent sexual imagery on websites 
not otherwise devoted to such material increases the likelihood that children 
and unwilling adults will encounter it.  As such material becomes increasingly 
difficult to avoid, increasing numbers of parents will restrict or deny their 
 
racial justice such as the NAACP relied on the courts as a matter of necessity).  Professor 
Bell analogized civil rights litigation to “a leaky boat that one paddles through treacherous 
waters.”  Derrick Bell, Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4, 35-36 
(1985).  As Bell suggests, pursuing civil rights litigation is essential until a better option 
presents itself.  Id. at 36. 
179 BELL, WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note 178, at 63-74 (explaining that progress on 
racial issues depends on the ability to convince whites that they will benefit from a social 
justice agenda); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the 
Interest Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980), reprinted in CRITICAL 
RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 20, 22 (Kimberlé 
Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter Bell, Interest Convergence].  Professor Bell 
contends that “the Fourteenth Amendment, standing alone, will not authorize a judicial 
remedy providing effective racial equality for blacks where the remedy sought threatens the 
superior societal status of middle- and upper-class whites.”  Bell, Interest Convergence, 
supra, at 22; see also Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Introduction to CRITICAL RACE 
THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE, at xvi-xvii (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 
2000) (“Because racism is an ingrained feature of our landscape, it looks ordinary and 
natural to persons in the culture. . . . [W]hite elites will tolerate or encourage racial advances 
for blacks only when such advances also promote white self-interest.”). 
180 See supra notes 12-22 and accompanying text. 
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children’s web access and other adults will turn away from the Internet in 
disgust.  Moreover, when online mobs post Social Security numbers and other 
information to facilitate identity theft, they increase the receipts of identity 
theft rings and spread costs throughout the financial sector.  Their 
dissemination of disinformation about potential employees in a manner that as 
a practical matter is impossible to refute distorts the employment market.181 
On a more granular level, support for this proposal will extend beyond those 
interested in protecting individuals from traditionally disadvantaged groups 
because the traditional criminal and tort law doctrines featured here can be 
invoked by individuals from dominant groups who have been attacked online.  
Examples of such online harassment abound.  For instance, in the summer of 
2008, a man sought to ruin the reputation of an investment banker, Steven 
Rattner, who allegedly had an affair with the man’s wife.182  On six websites, 
the man accused Mr. Rattner of trying to “steal” the man’s wife with exotic 
trips and expensive gifts.183  He included these accusations in e-mails to Mr. 
Rattner’s colleagues, clients, and reporters.184  Although Mr. Rattner admits 
having the affair, he says the man’s other claims are “either untrue or a gross 
exaggeration.”185  The online accusations spread like a virus, forcing Mr. 
Rattner to resign from his job.186  This example shows that because online 
attacks harm not only vulnerable individuals like women and minorities, but 
also individuals from dominant groups like Mr. Rattner, one can expect 
widespread support for the application of general tort and criminal law 
remedies for online assaults. 
2. Traditional Tort and Criminal Laws That Should Be Invoked to 
Combat Cyber Harassment 
Traditional criminal prosecutions and tort suits should be pursued to deter 
and remedy an online mob’s assaults.187  Prosecutors can pursue online mobs 
for computer-related crimes,188 such as hacking into a victim’s computers and 
password-protected accounts189 or disseminating denial-of-service and “image 
 
181 Even if the mobs’ accusations are only modestly persuasive, risk-averse employers 
may select other candidates. 
182 Andrew Ross Sorkin, On Wall St., Reputation Is Fragile, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2008, 
at C1. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 This Article does not catalogue every possible traditional tort or crime implicated by 
the attacks of online mobs.  Instead, it offers examples of traditional legal remedies that 
might be pursued against online mobs. 
188 Xiaomin Huang et al., Computer Crimes, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 285, 298-92 (2007). 
189 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2000) (punishing the intentional access of a computer 
without authorization to obtain information); id. § 1030(a)(4) (prohibiting unauthorized 
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reaping” attacks to shut down blogs and websites.190  They can also prosecute 
cyber mobs under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) for online threats of rape, strangulation, 
and other physical harm if victims could have reasonably believed that those 
threatening them expressed a serious intent to inflict bodily harm.191  Further, 
prosecutors could charge an individual with the intent to aid and abet identity 
theft for the posting of Social Security numbers.192  In addition to criminal 
prosecutions, victims can bring civil causes of action based on any of the 
computer-related crimes discussed above.193 
Targeted individuals could also pursue general tort claims, such as 
defamation.194  False statements and distorted pictures that disgrace plaintiffs 
or injure their careers constitute defamation per se, for which special damages 
 
access of a protected computer where the perpetrator intends to fraudulently obtain 
something of value); see, e.g., United States v. Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d 367, 371 (D. Conn. 
2001) (holding that stealing credit card numbers from a computer amounted to theft of 
something valuable under § 1030(a)(4)).  Computer hackers have been prosecuted for 
stealing a variety of sensitive personal information, from credit card numbers to medical 
data.  E.g., Selling Singer’s Files Gets Man Six Months, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 2, 2000, at 
A2; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Russian Computer Hacker Sentenced to Three 
Years in Prison (Oct. 4, 2002), available at http://www.cybercrime.gov/gorshkovSent.htm. 
190 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5) (imposing criminal sanctions for knowingly causing the 
transmission of a program, code, or command that causes damage to computers); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1030(e) (stating that victims need only suffer impairment to integrity or availability of 
data, programs, systems, or information to sustain a § 1030(a)(5) conviction). 
191 Section 875(c) prohibits the transmission “in interstate or foreign commerce” of 
communications that contain threats to injure another person.  18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2000); 
see, e.g., United States v. Teague, 443 F.3d 1310, 1317 (10th Cir. 2006).  Similarly, many 
states have some form of assault law that proscribes the use of words to create fear of harm 
in a victim.  See KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 90-104 
(1989).  In the AutoAdmit case, the targeted individuals could have reasonably believed that 
those threatening them meant to express a serious intent to inflict bodily harm and had the 
ability to carry out the attacks where the posts detailed their home addresses, clothing, and 
schedule, suggesting the poster’s close proximity.  See supra notes 54-87 and accompanying 
text (summarizing AutoAdmit postings that described female student’s attire, suggesting 
contact with targeted women, and warned of rape). 
192 The Identity Theft Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998 outlaws the knowing transfer 
or use of another person’s means of identification with the intent to commit or to aid or abet 
unlawful activity.  18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) (2000).  Courts have upheld convictions for 
aiding and abetting identity theft in cases where defendants posted Social Security numbers, 
home addresses, and driver’s licenses online for identity thieves to use.  United States v. 
Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944, 950-52, 959-60 (9th Cir. 2007). 
193 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2000); Fiber Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. Roehrs, 470 F.3d 1150, 1155-56 
(5th Cir. 2006). 
194 Cf. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, GUARDING LIFE’S DARK SECRETS: LEGAL AND SOCIAL 
CONTROLS OVER REPUTATION, PROPRIETY, AND PRIVACY 43, 235 (2007). 
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need not be proven.195  Numerous statements and pictures described in Part I, if 
indeed false, provide grounds for defamation claims as they degrade societal 
perceptions of the targeted individuals.196 
Victims could sue for public disclosure of private facts.  The public-
disclosure-of-private-facts tort involves the publicity of private, non-
newsworthy information, disclosure of which would be “highly offensive to a 
reasonable person.”197  The tort’s applicability seems clear for an online mob’s 
publication of a plaintiff’s Social Security number; such a release would offend 
the reasonable person given the concomitant risk of identity theft.198 
Many victims may have actions for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.  That tort responds to “extreme and outrageous conduct” by a 
defendant who intended to cause, or recklessly caused, the plaintiff’s severe 
emotional distress.199  Courts are more willing to consider conduct 
“outrageous” if the defendant exploited an existing power disparity between 
the parties or knowingly took advantage of a vulnerable plaintiff.200  Various 
types of online harassment have supported emotional distress claims, including 
threats of violence, the publication of a victim’s sensitive information, and 
disparaging racial remarks.201  Victims can certainly argue that many of the 
 
195 See, e.g., Kiesau v. Bantz, 686 N.W.2d 164, 169-70, 178 (Iowa 2004) (upholding a 
finding of libel per se where the defendant altered a photograph of a female police officer to 
make it appear that she intentionally exposed her breasts and e-mailed the picture to 
plaintiff’s colleagues); Rombom v. Weberman, No. 1378/00, 2002 WL 1461890, at *2 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 13, 2002) (upholding a defamation award based on defamatory per se 
for online postings asserting the plaintiff was a “pathological liar,” a psychopath, a burglar, 
and a kidnapper). 
196 See supra text accompaying notes 16, 18, 65-73, 80, 81, 95, 97, 119. 
197 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977); see DANIEL J. SOLOVE, 
UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 101-06 (2008). 
198 See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing the release of Ms. Sierra’s 
Social Security number). 
199 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965). 
200 Id. § 46 cmts. e-f (1965); see, e.g., Inland Mediation Bd. v. City of Pomona, 158 F. 
Supp. 2d 1120, 1132, 1156-57 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (upholding emotional distress claim based 
on defendant’s public comment that he refused to rent to Blacks because they “were nothing 
but trouble” and engaged in criminal behavior on the grounds that a jury “may consider a 
plaintiff’s race in evaluating the plaintiff’s susceptibility to emotional distress resulting from 
discriminatory conduct”). 
201 See, e.g., Gonsalves v. Conseco Ins. Co., No. Civ. S-06-0058 WBS KJM, 2006 WL 
3486962, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2006) (denying the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress because a reasonable jury 
could find that posting the plaintiff’s name and Social Security number on a website 
amounted to extreme and outrageous conduct); State v. Carpenter, 171 P.3d 41, 58 (Alaska 
2007) (holding the defendant radio announcer’s actions could constitute extreme and 
outrageous conduct because he gave his audience the plaintiff’s telephone and fax numbers 
and urged the audience to make the plaintiff’s life “a living hell”); Delfino v. Agilent 
Techs., Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 376, 382 n.6, 392 (2006) (concluding that “odious e-mail 
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assaults featured in Part I constitute “extreme and outrageous” conduct and 
caused severe emotional distress, as nearly all of them involved gruesome 
threats of physical violence and other forms of harassment.202 
Some victims may also bring actions for intrusion on seclusion.  This tort 
protects against intentional intrusions into a person’s “private affairs or 
concerns” if the intrusions would be “highly offensive to a reasonable 
person.”203  Courts have upheld intrusion claims for deliberate interruptions of 
a person’s online activities.204  Online mobs could face intrusion claims for 
hacking into password protected e-mail accounts containing private 
correspondence and conducting denial-of-service attacks to shut down personal 
blogs and websites.205 
B. A Crucial Deterrent and Remedy for Cyber Harassment of Vulnerable 
Individuals: Civil Rights Law 
A meaningful response to abusive online mobs would include the 
enforcement of existing civil rights laws for several reasons.  First, civil rights 
laws recognize the serious injuries that online mobs inflict on victims, their 
communities, and society as whole.206  Cyber attacks marginalize individuals 
belonging to traditionally subordinated groups, causing them deep 
psychological harm.207  Victims feel helpless to avoid future attacks because 
they are unable to change the characteristic that made them victims.208  They 
experience feelings of inferiority, shame, and a “profound sense of 
isolation.”209  The attacks perpetrate economic intimidation and suppress civic 
 
messages and postings” threatening, “‘[y]ou can look forward to all your fingers getting 
broken, several kicks to the ribs and mouth, break some teeth [sic], and a cracked head,’” 
may constitute extreme and outrageous acts). 
202 See supra text accompanying notes 15, 20-22, 86 (describing Kathy Sierra’s response 
to online threats, the emotional distress alleged by AutoAdmit plaintiffs, and online postings 
of victims’ Social Security numbers). 
203 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
204 See, e.g., Donnel v. Lara, 703 S.W.2d 257, 260 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (recognizing an 
intrusion claim where a creditor made intrusive phone calls to the plaintiff). 
205 See supra notes 90, 106, 115 and accompanying text (describing a mob’s conduct of 
hacking into a woman’s e-mail, Facebook, and MySpace accounts to obtain her passwords 
and sensitive personal information and detailing denial-of-service and “image reaping” 
attacks). 
206 Frederick M. Lawrence, The Evolving Federal Role in Bias Crimes Law Enforcement 
and the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 251, 255-59 (2008) 
[hereinafter Lawrence, Evolving Role]. 
207 See Joshua Cohen, Freedom of Expression, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 207, 255-57 (1993). 
208 FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN LAW 40 
(1999) [hereinafter LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE]. 
209 Id. at 40-41; Lawrence, Evolving Role, supra note 206, at 255.  Charles Lawrence 
distinguishes racist speech from other offensive words because they “evoke in you all of the 
millions of cultural lessons regarding your inferiority that you have so painstakingly 
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engagement, depriving vulnerable individuals of their equal right to participate 
in social, economic, and political life.210 
Bias-motivated conduct also provokes retaliation and incites community 
unrest.211  Such attacks also harm the community that shares the victim’s race, 
gender, religion, or ethnicity – community members experience attacks as if 
the attacks happened to them.212  Moreover, society suffers when victims and 
community members isolate themselves to avoid future attacks and when cyber 
mobs violate our shared values of equality and pluralism.213  Traditional tort 
and criminal law fail to respond to such systemic harm and, indeed, may 
obscure a full view of the damage. 
Second, a civil rights approach would play a valuable normative and 
expressive role in society.214  Civil rights prosecutions would communicate 
society’s commitment to “values of equality of treatment and opportunity” and 
make clear that conduct transgressing those values will not be tolerated.215  
 
repressed, and imprint upon you a badge of servitude and subservience for all the world to 
see.”  Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on 
Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 461. 
210 See KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 13 (1989); ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL 
EQUALITY 57-114 (1996) (summarizing arguments that a central purpose of 
antidiscrimination law is to remedy the stigmatization that deprives individuals of equal 
participation in society). 
211 See Lawrence, Evolving Role, supra note 206, at 258 & n.20 (describing the Crown 
Heights riots, in which “the mere perception of a bias crime” provoked several days of 
retaliation and community unrest). 
212 See id. at 257-58. 
213 LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE, supra note 208, at 43-44. 
214 See Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. 
REV. 1, 2, 30, 37 (2000) (exploring the expressive dimension of law in equality 
jurisprudence and articulating an expressivist theory of Equal Protection, namely that “state 
action violates Equal Protection if its meaning conflicts with the government’s obligation to 
treat each person with equal concern”).  A compelling body of literature addresses the merits 
of expressivist conceptions of law more generally.  Id. at 28-37.  See generally Matthew D. 
Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000) 
(concluding that expressive theories of the law are unpersuasive because adherents confuse 
“social meaning” with linguistic meaning); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: 
Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725 (1998) 
(espousing the importance of the “expressive dimension of governmental action” in 
constitutional law as a foil to Dworkin’s conception of rights as “trumps” that protect 
individual interests contrary to the common good). 
215 LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE, supra note 208, at 167-69. 
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They also would be a powerful stigmatizing tool216 because the fear of censure 
might inhibit abusive behavior.217 
Third, viewing the assaults as civil rights violations might provide an 
incentive for prosecutors to pursue criminal charges.  To date, law 
enforcement’s response to online criminal activities has evolved slowly.218  
Computer crimes are difficult to prosecute given law enforcement’s relative 
unfamiliarity with technology.219  Prosecutors might devote more resources to 
untangling a case’s difficult technological issues if they recognized its civil 
rights implications. 
Fourth, civil rights laws have attractive remedial features.  Because damages 
may be hard to prove and quantify, and because many plaintiffs cannot afford 
to litigate based on principle alone, the high cost of litigation often deters the 
filing of general tort suits.220  The awards of attorney’s fees possible under 
many civil rights statutes might make some cases affordable to pursue. 
Fifth, civil rights suits may reach wrongs that would otherwise escape 
liability.  These include victims’ rights to be free from economic intimidation 
and cyber harassment based on race and gender. 
Finally, civil rights law has adapted over the years to many of the conditions 
that exacerbate the extreme behavior of online mobs.221  It has had to respond 
to hateful mobs emboldened by anonymity.  It also has confronted the 
objectification of subordinated people, a process the Internet fosters by 
disaggregating people into screen presences that mob members can attack as if 
playing a computer game. 
1. Common Civil Rights Doctrines 
Online assaults motivated by race discrimination that interfere with an 
individual’s ability to make a living can support civil and criminal actions.222  
42 U.S.C. § 1981 guarantees members of racial minorities “the same right in 
every State . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white 
 
216 See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 
592 (1996) (explaining the expressive and normative importance of imprisonment as 
symbolizing moral condemnation). 
217 See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 
2029-36 (1996).  Of course, the tort remedies and criminal prosecutions discussed above 
also play an important expressive and normative role.  See supra Part II.A.2. 
218 Smith, supra note 51, at 28. 
219 Huang et al., supra note 188, at 315-16. 
220 See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in 
Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 872-76 (2000). 
221 See supra Part I.B. 
222 This Section focuses on federal civil rights legislation, both criminal and civil, which 
often parallel laws on the state level. 
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citizens . . . .”223  A plaintiff must show that the defendant intended to 
discriminate on the basis of race and that the discrimination concerned the 
“making and enforcement” of contracts.224  Courts have upheld § 1981 
damages in cases where masked mob members used tactics of intimidation to 
prevent members of racial minorities from “making a living” in their chosen 
field.225  Section 1981 remedies “purely private” acts of racial discrimination 
and thus does not require state action.226 
Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(C), a provision of the Civil Rights Act of 
1968, criminalizes “force or threat[s] of force” designed to intimidate or 
interfere with a person’s private employment due to that person’s race, 
religion, or national origin.227  Congress enacted § 245 to rid interstate 
commerce of the burdens imposed by denying persons equal employment 
opportunities and other federally protected activities through threats of 
violence.228  Courts have upheld § 245 prosecutions where defendants 
threatened violence over employees’ e-mail and voicemail.229 
Gender discrimination that interferes with a person’s ability to make a living 
can be pursued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 
sanctions those who intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, 
threaten, or coerce someone with the purpose of interfering with employment 
 
223 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000); Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609 
(1987).  Section 1981 was enacted under the Thirteenth Amendment, which allowed 
Congress to rationally determine the badges and incidents of slavery and to translate them 
into effective legislation.  Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 170 (1976).  People who are 
protected by the statute include those who “are subjected to intentional discrimination solely 
because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics.”  Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. at 613. 
224 Morris v. Office Max, Inc., 89 F.3d 411, 413 (7th Cir. 1996).  The “mak[ing] and 
enforce[ment of] contracts” is defined as “the making, performance, modification, and 
termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms and conditions 
of the contractual relationship.”  42 U.S.C. § 1981(b). 
225 E.g., Vietnamese Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 518 F. Supp. 
993, 1001-04, 1008, 1016-17 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (upholding a judgment in a § 1981 case 
where hooded Klan members threatened violence and burned crosses to prevent Vietnamese 
fishermen from fishing in Gulf waters which held plaintiffs had a protected interest in 
making a living free from racial animus). 
226 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 185 (1989); Runyon, 427 U.S. at 
170. 
227 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(C) (2000).  “The statutory language that eventually became § 
245 originated in Title V of the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1966.”  United States v. Lane, 
883 F.2d 1484, 1489 n.8 (10th Cir. 1989). 
228 Lane, 883 F.2d at 1492-93 (holding that § 245(b)(2)(C) could be applied in the race-
motivated murder of a Jewish radio talk show host because Congress may, in a valid 
exercise of its Commerce Clause power, “prohibit a person from denying another person 
equal employment opportunities because of his race by violently injuring or killing him”). 
229 United States v. Syring, 522 F. Supp. 2d 125, 126 (D.D.C. 2007). 
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opportunities due to their gender.230  The Attorney General can file civil suits 
for injunctive relief.231  Such actions can be asserted against private actors 
because Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 pursuant to 
a valid exercise of its power to regulate interstate commerce.232  Courts have 
upheld Title VII violations where masked defendants engaged in “economic 
coercion” and intimidation to prevent vulnerable individuals from 
employment.233 
Destructive online crowds intimidate women and members of racial and 
religious minorities, preventing them from “making a living” due to 
discriminatory animus.  Because the Internet fuses our public and private lives 
and is a workplace for many, online attacks on vulnerable individuals often 
interfere with their equal right to pursue work.  For instance, women who stop 
blogging in the face of an online mob’s attack lose advertising revenue and 
opportunities for advancement.234  According to technology blogger Robert 
Scoble, women who lack a robust online presence are “never going to be 
included in the [technology] industry.”235  Online mobs also conduct denial-of-
service attacks to shut down blogs that generate income for women and racial 
minorities.  They spread damaging statements to employers and professors for 
whom victims may work in order to interfere with their employment 
opportunities. 
Online mob attacks also implicate state laws penalizing those who harass or 
stalk another by communicating words, images, or language through electronic 
mail or the Internet, directed to a specific person, which would cause a 
reasonable person substantial emotional distress or fear of bodily harm.236  
 
230 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000). 
231 Id. § 2000e-6. 
232 United States v. Original Knights of Ku Klux Klan, 250 F. Supp. 330, 349 (E.D. La. 
1965); see Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964); 
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964). 
233 Original Knights of Ku Klux Klan, 250 F. Supp. at 356. 
234 See Nakashima, supra note 9. 
235 Id. 
236 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 653m(b) (West 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048 
(West 2007).  Typically, the mens rea for cyber stalking crimes is the intent to engage in 
conduct that causes the targeted individual to fear for her safety or suffer severe emotional 
distress.  Naomi Harlin Goodno, Cyberstalking, a New Crime: Evaluating the Effectiveness 
of Current State and Federal Laws, 72 MO. L. REV. 125, 133-34 (2007).  Forty-six stalking 
and harassment state statutes have withstood vagueness and overbreadth challenges.  See, 
e.g., State v. Richards, 896 P.2d 357, 359-60 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995); Commonwealth v. 
Hendrickson, 724 A.2d 315, 319 (Pa. 1999).  States such as Oregon revised harassment laws 
that were struck down on vagueness and overbroad grounds.  Compare State v. Sanderson, 
575 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Or. Ct. App. 1978) (en banc) (striking down a harassment statute 
because the phrase “alarms or seriously annoys” was too vague), with State v. Maxwell, 998 
P.2d 680, 684-86 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (upholding a stalking conviction against a challenge 
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Some states explicitly criminalize posting messages with the intent to urge or 
incite others to harass a particular individual.237  For instance, California 
authorities obtained a guilty plea from a defendant who terrorized a victim by 
impersonating her in chat rooms and online bulletin boards, where the 
defendant posted the victim’s home address and messages suggesting the 
victim fantasized about being raped.238 
2. Civil Rights Doctrines Focusing on Anonymous Attackers 
Civil rights law has long recognized the dangers that anonymous mobs pose.  
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) allows damage suits against: 
[T]wo or more persons in any State or Territory [who] conspire or go in 
disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of 
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of 
the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities 
under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the 
constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to 
all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the 
laws . . . .239 
To similar effect, § 241 establishes criminal penalties for “two or more 
persons [who] go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another, 
with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or 
privilege” that is “secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United 
States, or because of his having so exercised the same.”240 
Online mobs go in disguise on the Internet for the admitted purpose of 
suppressing the free speech of victims expressly targeted because they are 
women, people of color, members of religious minorities, or gays or lesbians.  
Sections 1985 and 241 similarly proscribe conspiracies to deprive others of 
civil rights.241  Section 1986 then establishes a cause of action against any 
person, “having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be done, and 
 
that the statutory term “visual or physical presence” was unconstitutionally vague under the 
Oregon Constitution). 
237 E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.21.1(A)(1)-(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008). 
238 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1999 REPORT ON CYBERSTALKING: A NEW CHALLENGE FOR 
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INDUSTRY (1999), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/cyberstalking.htm.    Part I documents examples 
of such online harassment and stalking of women and people of color. 
239 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2000). 
240 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2000). 
241 Section 1985(3) simply creates a cause of action against conspiracies with any of the 
same objects proscribed for persons going in disguise.  42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).  Section 241 
criminalizes “conspir[acies] to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in [the 
United States] in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by 
the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the 
same . . . .”  18 U.S.C. §241. 
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mentioned in section 1985 . . . are about to be committed,” who could have 
helped prevent those acts from being committed but who fails to do so.242 
Efforts to apply these statutes to anonymous online mobs nonetheless face 
formidable obstacles.  During Reconstruction, United States v. Cruikshank 
interpreted the language of the Enforcement Act, which included much of the 
language later incorporated into § 1985(3), as not reaching purely private 
conspiracies, and suggested Congress lacked the authority to go farther.243  
Almost one hundred years later, the Court found that Congress could reach 
some purely private conspiracies through its powers to implement the 
Thirteenth Amendment and to protect the right to interstate travel.244  More 
recently, however, the Court narrowed the statute’s reach, finding it only 
covers private conspiracies “‘aimed at interfering with rights’ that are 
‘protected against private, as well as official, encroachment.’”245  The Court 
held that freedom of speech is not such a right.246 
The Court noted that the Commerce Clause “no doubt” allowed Congress to 
proscribe private efforts to prevent the exercise of speech or rights secured 
only against state interference, but held “§ 1985(3) is not such a provision” 
because of its references to “rights, privileges, and immunities” under the 
laws.247  Whatever one may think of this interpretation, Congress has since 
enacted such a law.  The Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”) penalizes 
anyone who “utilizes a telecommunications device, whether or not 
conversation or communication ensues, without disclosing his identity and 
with the intent to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass any person at the called 
number or who receives communications” with fines or imprisonment.248  A 
telecommunications device is defined to include “any device or software that 
can be used to originate telecommunications or other types of communications 
 
242 42 U.S.C. § 1986. 
243 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554-55 (1875). 
244 Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 104-06 (1971). 
245 Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 268 (1993) (quoting 
United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 833 (1983)).  The Court also 
suggested “it is a close question whether § 1985(3) was intended to reach any class-based 
animus other than animus against Negroes and those who championed their cause . . . .”  
United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 610, 163 U.S. at 836. 
246 United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 610, 163 U.S. at 830. 
247 Id. at 833. 
248 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a)(1)(C) (West 2008).  At its passage, the statute stirred significant 
controversy given its inclusion of the term “annoy” because the term might capture a wide 
range of anonymous Internet banter that falls short of cyber stalking.  Goodno, supra note 
236, at 149; Posting of Daniel J. Solove to Concurring Opinions, 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2006/01/annoy_someone_o.html#c1603 (Jan. 
10, 2006, 00:27).  Courts have responded to this controversy, finding that although the 
statute might have unconstitutional applications, it would not warrant facial invalidation on 
vagueness or over breadth grounds.  See, e.g., United States v. Eckhardt, 466 F.3d 938, 943-
44 (11th Cir. 2006). 
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that are transmitted, in whole or in part, by the Internet.”249  The provision 
applies to individuals who anonymously and intentionally harass or threaten 
another over the Internet.250  Given prosecutors’ reluctance to date to invoke 
VAWA,251 Congress would do well to enact a parallel civil remedy to 
accompany it, much as § 1985(3) and § 1986 supplement § 241. 
III. PROTECTING ONLINE DIALOGUE 
Civil rights movements have fairly similar life cycles.  In its first stage, the 
movement seeks recognition of a marginalized group’s members as social 
equals worthy of respect.  At this stage, the law has an enormous impact on the 
well-being of subordinated people – such as its recognition of equal 
citizenship, the ability to marry, the right to own property, and so forth – but 
only a minor impact on society’s overall functionality.252  Here, the movement 
can be characterized primarily as an assault on the most gratuitous 
manifestations of discrimination. 
Bringing full equality to formerly subordinated people, however, typically 
requires more.  The civil rights movement next comes into conflict with 
entrenched societal values.  Abolitionists faced claims of property rights and 
states’ rights.253  The civil rights movement of the mid-twentieth century again 
confronted claims for limited government and states’ rights.254  More recent 
efforts to integrate people of color, and women, into public life have faced 
similar resistance, asserting New Deal norms of efficiency and merit.255  In 
each case, advocates of the entrenched, supposedly neutral norm insist that it 
must be upheld absolutely lest the law slide down a slippery slope leading to a 
profoundly worse society.256  Implicit, and sometimes explicit, in these calls to 
 
249 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(h)(1)(C). 
250 United States v. Tobin, 545 F. Supp. 2d 189, 193 (D.N.H. 2008) (finding that a 
defendant must “have a specific purpose to cause emotional upset in a person”).  Naomi 
Goodno suggests that cyberstalking statutes may be inapplicable to online postings that 
terrorize victims and may only apply to e-mail directed to the victim.  Goodno, supra note 
236, at 149.  Yet VAWA extends to communications “originat[ing]” from a “device or 
software” that were “transmitted, in whole or in part, by the Internet” to a victim who 
“receives the communication,” 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a)(1)(C)-(h)(1)(C), and thus a less 
restrictive reading is certainly possible. 
251 Kelli C. McTaggart, Note, The Violence Against Women Act: Recognizing a Federal 
Civil Right to Be Free from Violence, 86 GEO. L.J. 1123, 1146 (1998). 
252 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE LAW IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 94 (1974). 
253 See Austin Allen, Rethinking Dred Scott: New Context for an Old Case, 82 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 141, 145 (2007). 
254 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 526.  Absolutist claims based on these norms 
successfully derailed the Reconstruction-era civil rights movement, leading to a century of 
brutal subordination and hardship that discredited rather than strengthening states’ rights. 
255 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, LAW IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY 143 (2002). 
256 See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Defending the First Amendment from 
Antidiscrimination Laws, 82 N.C. L. REV. 223, 227-28 (2003) (arguing that 
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hold supposedly neutral norms inviolate is a demand that marginalized 
individuals sacrifice full equality for the greater good.257 
In hindsight, these absolutists appear misguided.  Requiring foundational 
norms to accommodate civil rights did not destroy those norms but, in some 
cases, strengthened them.  Property rights had never been absolute, and ceasing 
to treat human beings as the property of another buttressed property law’s 
credibility by separating it from the ignominy of slavery.  States and public 
accommodations lost the right to exclude or discriminate on the basis of race, 
yet states’ powers have, if anything, grown, perhaps because states seem more 
trustworthy having shed the baggage of Jim Crow.  Civil rights legislation did 
not stop deregulation and deep tax cuts from shrinking government.  And as 
employers come to grips with the realities of diverse workplaces and 
accommodation of people with disabilities, they are finding that diverse 
environments do not sacrifice efficiency, but, in fact, enhance it.258 
If past conflicts between civil rights and those foundational values seem 
contrived today, it is because we recognize that those values retain their power 
without being absolute259 and that accommodating them to civil rights norms 
has not led to their wholesale collapse.  We should assess the argument that 
free speech absolutism should trump civil rights concerns in light of this 
history. 
In much the same way the pre-Industrial Age underscored the importance of 
property rights and the Industrial Age exalted private ordering through 
contract, the Information Age depends upon the Internet for its economic 
success.  The Internet is also as fundamental to shaping our current political 
order as the concepts of states’ rights and limited government were in an 
earlier age.260  Just as changing circumstances justified curtailing the right to 
contract in the 1930s, today’s networked environment warrants a rejection of 
free-speech absolutism.261  Allowing women, people of color, and other 
 
antidiscrimination laws threaten free speech and that the government’s weakening of civil 
liberties in favor of equality threatens to undermine all other liberties). 
257 See J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the 
First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 383-84 [hereinafter Balkin, Realism About 
Pluralism] (explaining that the Ku Klux Klan embraced an absolutist approach to the First 
Amendment that once held sway with civil rights activists of the 1950s and 1960s in 
denouncing laws that combat racial discrimination). 
258 See id. at 420-21 (arguing that an absolutist approach to the First Amendment is 
misguided when addressing sexual and racial harassment in the workplace as there will be 
no counter speech due to the directness of the intimidation). 
259 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 92 (1977) (contrasting absolute 
and less-than-absolute rights and noting that the strength of society’s commitment to a 
particular right can be assessed by which other rights society allows that particular right to 
trump). 
260 YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION 
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 232 (2006). 
261 Balkin, Realism About Pluralism, supra note 257, at 383. 
  
98 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:61 
 
vulnerable people to be denied the full panoply of the opportunities available 
on the Internet, rather than searching for a meaningful accommodation with 
other important norms, would constitute a heavy blow to both civil rights and 
civil liberties. 
Section A argues that robust protection of civil rights on the Internet would, 
in fact, promote far more valuable speech than it would inhibit.  Section B 
looks more broadly at normative bases of the protection of free speech in 
society, finding that a balancing of civil rights goals with free speech values is 
feasible and desirable here.  Section C explores why First Amendment doctrine 
does not impede the protections of cyber civil rights described in Part II. 
A. Online Mobs and Individual Autonomy 
One of free speech’s most important functions is promoting individual 
autonomy.262  This view urges that people be free to choose their own path.263  
Free speech facilitates self-mastery, allowing people to author their own 
narratives.264  Commentators characterize respect for autonomy of speech and 
thought as necessary for legitimate government.265  For some, freedom from 
any form of coercion is paramount for autonomy and dignity.266  Others argue 
that autonomy and dignity require equitable and effective participation in 
political self-government, and thus the regulation of certain speech, such as 
racist and sexist speech, may be an essential prerequisite to secure equal 
citizenship.267 
Restraining a mob’s most destructive assaults is essential to defending the 
expressive autonomy and equality of its victims.268  Preventing mobs from 
driving vulnerable people offline would “advance the reasons why we protect 
free speech in the first place,” even though it would inevitably chill some 
 
262 See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7 (1970); 
C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 
964-66 (1978); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Essay, Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 
875, 875 (1994); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 
(1982) (“[F]ree speech ultimately serves only one true value, which I have labeled 
‘individual self-realization.’”). 
263 RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 61 (1985); Redish, supra note 262, at 
593. 
264 JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 408-10 (1986). 
265 Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 267, 279-85 (1991). 
266 Id. at 284; see EMERSON, supra note 262, at 6. 
267 See Mary Ellen Gale, Reimagining the First Amendment: Racist Speech and Equal 
Liberty, 65 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 119, 155-56 (1991) (arguing that positive freedom requires 
“recognition and respect as an equal, autonomous self” and “protection or release from 
nongovernmental social constraints”); Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 
1493, 1531-32 (1988). 
268 See FISS, supra note 153, at 15. 
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speech of online mobs.269  Free from mob attacks, victims might continue to 
blog, join online discussions, and generally express themselves on public 
issues.  Protecting them from grotesque defamation, threats, invasions of 
privacy, and technological attacks would allow them to be candid about their 
ideas.270 
Although online mobs express themselves and their autonomy through their 
assaults, their actions also implicate their victims’ autonomy and ability to 
participate in political and social discourse.271  Self-expression should receive 
no protection if its sole purpose is to extinguish the self-expression of 
another.272  As Owen Fiss argues, sometimes we must lower the voices of 
some to permit the self-expression of others.273  Similarly, Cass Sunstein 
contends that threats, libel, and sexual and racial harassment constitute low-
value speech of little First Amendment consequence.274  Rarely is that more 
true than when one group of voices consciously exploits the Internet’s 
aggregating power to silence others and its disaggregative power to escape 
social responsibility for the group’s actions. 
B. Civil Rights and the Theory of Free Speech Online 
The importance of free speech warrants vigilance against threats that 
weaken public discourse.275  These concerns, however, are not absolute.276  
Our society permits restrictions on speech that is “of such slight social value as 
a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from [it] is clearly 
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”277  The Internet poses 
several challenges to striking that balance. 
This Section explores the challenges of applying First Amendment theory to 
cyberspace.  Section 1 identifies the special problem of distinguishing 
 
269 See SOLOVE, supra note 4, at 129. 
270 Id. at 131. 
271 See FISS, supra note 153, at 16 (arguing that hate speech regulations address speech 
that vitiates a disadvantaged group’s ability to contribute to public discussion). 
272 STEVEN J. HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH, HUMAN DIGNITY 166 (2008). 
273 See FISS, supra note 150, at 18; Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 
781, 786 (1987) (“Autonomy may be protected, but only when it enriches public debate.”); 
accord CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 127 (1995). 
274 SUNSTEIN, supra note 273, at 11. 
275 Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008); see 
Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling Effect,” 
58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 689 (1978).  A host of theories offer competing explanations of the 
First Amendment.  See Richards, supra.  This Article does not discuss the merits of these 
theories in the abstract but instead addresses those that present the most compelling 
arguments against challenging online mobs. 
276 SOLOVE, supra note 4, at 128-29; T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the 
Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 947 (1987). 
277 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
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protected expressions from unprotected actions in a medium that functions 
exclusively by transmitting packets of data.  Section 2 considers online mobs 
in the context of some prominent First Amendment theories.  Section 3 
assesses whether private correction of online mobs’ abuses might obviate the 
need for a legal response.  Finally, Section 4 explores the extent to which 
online mobs’ protected speech might be curtailed or chilled by enforcement of 
the doctrines advocated here. 
1. The Expression-Action Distinction on the Internet 
A core problem in theorizing the First Amendment is distinguishing 
expressions from actions.  This speech-conduct dichotomy pervades free 
speech discourse.278  Advances in law and technology, however, complicate 
this distinction as they make more actions achievable through “mere” words.  
Indeed, the Internet’s very essence is to aggregate expressions so as to convert 
them into actions.  Some Internet behaviors that are akin to the offline crimes 
of breaking and entering and vandalism – hacking and denial-of-service attacks 
– are accomplished by sending communications to other computers.  
Moreover, the Internet’s powerful aggregative capacity converts seemingly 
individual expressions (e.g., visiting a website or sending an e-mail) into 
criminal acts through their repetition (e.g., denial-of-service attacks and image 
reaping).  The Internet also routinely allows individuals to aggregate their 
efforts with strangers.  Thus, the fact that someone may not know the identity 
of a thief or rapist who uses posted personal information does not eliminate the 
danger, because the poster knows that such predators may put the information 
to malicious use. 
The Internet may also disaggregate communications into components that 
operate as actions.  For example, some online rape threats engender serious 
fear that they will be carried out offline because they arrive without cues – 
such as the identity or location of the person who made the threat or a joking 
tone of voice – that might diminish the nature of the threat.279  The person’s 
refusal to leave cues that would mitigate the victim’s fear arguably 
demonstrates that person’s intent to terrorize the victim.  This can convert 
expression into criminal conduct.  In short, because everything that happens on 
 
278 EMERSON, supra note 262, at 8, 17 (explaining that the theory of expression rests 
upon a “fundamental distinction” between expression and action, which permits society to 
exercise more control over action than expression if the action is not controlled by limiting 
expression, because freedom of expression is essential to personality and all other freedoms 
and because expression does less injury to other social goals than action and has less 
immediate consequences). 
279 THE SOCIAL NET: UNDERSTANDING HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN CYBERSPACE 248 (Yair 
Amichai-Hamburger ed., 2005); Shaheen Shariff & Leanne Johnny, Cyber-Libel and Cyber-
Bullying: Can Schools Protect Student Reputations and Free-Expression in Virtual 
Environments?, 16 EDUC. & L.J. 307, 314 (2007). 
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the Internet ultimately takes the form of 1s and 0s does not mean that it is all 
the expression of ideas. 
The expression-action distinction for cyberspace is elusive.280  One could 
argue that hacking and denial-of-service attacks work first on computers and 
only indirectly on the computers’ owners.  The same, however, could be said 
of responding to an online poll or visiting a site solely to enhance its hit count.  
Alternatively, one could categorize online activity based on its offline 
analogues.  Unfortunately, this would lead to difficult debates over the strength 
of competing analogies.  Even more importantly, this approach ignores the 
ways in which the Internet’s aggregative and disaggregative character 
fundamentally transforms online activity.  One might ask which characteristic 
– expression or action – dominates the activity.281  But this question may be 
difficult to answer, as behavior is often equal parts expression and action.282  
For instance, the picture with Ms. Sierra being suffocated by lingerie283 
arguably constitutes both action meant to terrorize her and expression designed 
to communicate feelings of hatred and misogyny. 
A final option would be to treat online behavior as conduct if a reasonable 
person would expect or intend it to have offline effects independent of the 
expression of ideas.  Thus, threats that frighten recipients and disclosures of 
personal information that empower identity thieves to obtain victims’ money 
could both be regarded as criminal conduct, like denial-of-service attacks and 
hacking.  This principle would compel some judgment calls, although these 
would be broadly similar to those the Court’s Confrontation Clause doctrine 
requires in determining the admissibility of statements of witnesses who are 
unavailable for cross-examination.284  It would, however, take full account of 
the fundamental changes in our modes of both expression and action wrought 
by the Internet. 
 
280 Indeed, as Fred Lawrence persuasively explains, the action-expression distinction is 
elusive no matter the context.  Frederick M. Lawrence, Resolving the Hate Crimes/Hate 
Speech Paradox: Punishing Bias Crimes and Protecting Racist Speech, 68 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 673, 692-93 (1993) [hereinafter Lawrence, Resolving Paradox].  This argument has 
even more force in cyberspace given the aggregative and disaggregative qualities of online 
activity. 
281 See EMERSON, supra note 262, at 18. 
282 John Hart Ely, Comment, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of 
Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1495-
96 (1975); Lawrence, supra note 280, at 692-94 (explaining, for example, that burning a 
cross on the lawn of an African-American family is “one hundred percent action directed 
against” the family and “one hundred percent expression of deeply-felt racism”). 
283 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
284 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004). 
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2. The Values the First Amendment Protects 
Freedom of expression serves several important purposes.285  Limiting 
online mobs’ abuses as proposed above would not threaten any of their core 
values.  Freedom of expression facilitates deliberation about public issues and 
hence promotes democratic governance.286  Under this view, expression 
deserves protection if it promotes ideas and information necessary for a self-
governing citizenry to make decisions about what kind of life it wishes to 
live.287  A mob’s online attacks do not involve discourse on political issues.  
Quite the contrary, the attacks deprive vulnerable individuals of their right to 
engage in political discourse.  The threats, lies, and damaging photographs 
generate a fear of physical violence, exclusion, and subordination that may 
propel victims offline.288 
Democratic culture theorists argue that freedom of expression promotes 
“democracy in the widest possible sense, not merely at the level of governance, 
or at the level of deliberation, but at the level of culture” where we interact, 
create, build communities, and build ourselves.289  Free speech permits 
innovation in a networked age where people aggregate their ideas with those of 
others, create works of art, gossip, and parody, and thus continually add to the 
cultural mix in which they live.290  It enables individuals to participate in 
creating culture on equal terms.291  Free speech also dissolves unjust social 
barriers of rank and privilege.292  In this vein, Diane Zimmerman highlights the 
role of gossip as generating intimacy and a sense of community among 
disparate groups.293  Gossip provides people a way to learn about social groups 
 
285 See, e.g., EMERSON, supra note 262, at 6-7; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 785-89 (2d ed. 1988) (emphasizing two values protected by the First 
Amendment – the intrinsic value of speech, which is the value of self-expression, and the 
instrumental value of speech – and how the First Amendment protects dissent to maximize 
public discourse, to achieve robust debate and ideas, and to make our democracy work). 
286 TRIBE, supra note 285, at 577; Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an 
Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255. 
287 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 25-
27 (1948); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 
IND. L.J. 1, 26 (1971); Owen M. Fiss, Essay, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. 
REV. 1405, 1409-10 (1986). 
288 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 273, at 186 (arguing that hate speech such as the word 
“ni[**]er” creates fears of physical violence, exclusion, and subordination that silence 
individuals). 
289 Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 34 (2004). 
290 Id. 
291 Id. at 35. 
292 Id. 
293 Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and 
Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 333-34 (1983). 
  
2009] CYBER CIVIL RIGHTS 103 
 
to which they do not belong and fosters relationships by giving strangers the 
means to bridge awkward silences when thrown together in social situations.294 
Online mobs do indeed engage in gossip.  Sites such as JuicyCampus 
promote themselves as gossip facilitators.  But the attacks perpetrated by 
online mobs have little to do with building bonds among disparate 
communities.  Rape threats, lies, damaging photographs, and denial-of-service 
attacks not only preclude any connection with differently-minded group 
members, but they also sever the victim’s connections with her own 
community.  The attacks inflict serious social harm rather than generating 
ideas in popular culture or enforcing positive social norms.  Defeating such 
discrimination outweighs the imperceptible contribution that online mobs 
make to our cultural interaction and exchange. 
Still others focus on free speech as an engine promoting truth.295  In this 
view, any silencing of speech prevents us from better understanding the world 
in which we live.296  Justice Holmes drew from this theory when he articulated 
the notion of the marketplace of ideas: “that the best test of truth is the power 
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.”297  The 
marketplace-of-ideas metaphor places no special premium on political 
discussion.298  Instead, it captures the idea that “truth must be experimentally 
determined from the properties of the experience itself.”299 
An extreme version of truth-seeking theory might insist the market should 
sort out online mobs’ deceptions.  Though to do so, the theory would have to 
consider a Social Security number a truthful fact, disclosure of which 
contributes to an understanding of that person.300  A more plausible vision of 
truth-seeking theory, however, is not served with the disclosure of a person’s 
 
294 Id. at 334; see also Robert Post, The Legal Regulation of Gossip: Backyard Chatter 
and the Mass Media, in GOOD GOSSIP 65, 65 (Robert F. Goodman & Aaron Ben-Ze’ev eds., 
1994). 
295 ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 128 
(1969); Frederick F. Schauer, Language, Truth, and the First Amendment: An Essay in 
Memory of Harry Canter, 64 VA. L. REV. 263, 272 (1978) (describing the marketplace of 
ideas theory where the views and speech accepted by those in the marketplace are “true” 
and the views and speech rejected by the marketplace are “false.”). 
296 Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 
CAL. L. REV. 2353, 2363 (2000). 
297 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also 
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the purpose of the First 
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately 
prevail . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
298 SUNSTEIN, supra note 273, at 25. 
299 Post, supra note 296, at 2360. 
300 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 232-38 (1981) (seeing personal 
information’s main purpose as allowing the market to judge an individual). 
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personal identifying information.301  Rather than revealing a fact to be tested in 
the marketplace, a Social Security number is simply a key to a person’s credit 
and bank accounts.302  In this context, it is a weapon, not a truth or half-truth to 
be tested in the marketplace.  Rape and death threats similarly tell us nothing 
about the victims – no truths are contested there.  This is equally true of denial-
of-service attacks and “image reaping.”  Even where online mobs make factual 
assertions, features of the Internet prevent the marketplace of ideas from 
performing its intended curative function, as the next Section shows.  
Moreover, as Daniel Solove notes, “truth isn’t the only value at stake.”303 
3. The Inadequacy of Private Responses 
One common offline response to some kinds of unpleasant speech is 
exclusion of the speaker.  Someone who disrupts a private party or meeting 
may not receive an invitation back.  A proliferation of annoying sound trucks 
may yield time, place, and manner restrictions, such as a noise ordinance.304  
Stations that broadcast obscenity when children often listen may lose their 
licenses.305  Although exclusion can be ineffective against many forms of 
offensive expression offline, it is particularly ineffective online where 
individuals can easily frustrate any exclusion by disaggregating their on- and 
offline identities: an individual ejected from a website under one screen name 
could promptly return under another. 
Nonetheless, some may argue that private responses obviate the need for 
criminal, tort, and civil rights remedies.  In particular, they may contend that 
victims can defeat online crowds without this proposal by recruiting advocacy 
 
301 The release of sensitive information, such as a person’s medical condition, may not 
advance the truth-seeking function of the marketplace.  Cognitive and behavioral 
psychologists, sociologists, and economists challenge the notion that people with access to 
information will use it to make rational decisions.  ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID 
WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 33 (2007).  
Individuals are prone to cognitive distortions that may lead them to make decisions that 
differ from those predicted in a world of perfect rationality.  Paul Horwitz, Free Speech as 
Risk Analysis: Heuristics, Biases, and Institutions in the First Amendment, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 
1, 6 (2003).  This argument may be particularly persuasive where information confirms 
discriminatory biases.  See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of 
Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 976 (1978); Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press – A New 
First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1678 (1967). 
302 See Citron, supra note 43, at 252-53. 
303 SOLOVE, supra note 4, at 132. 
304 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (holding a jacket with the phrase 
“F[**]k the Draft” on the back worn in a courthouse was protected speech because “persons 
confronted with [the] jacket were in a quite different posture than, say, those subjected to 
the raucous emissions of sound trucks blaring outside their residences”). 
305 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 738 (1978) (finding the FCC was 
warranted in sanctioning licensees who engage in obscene, indecent, or profane 
broadcasting). 
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groups to defend them.  Women’s groups could coordinate efforts to rebuild a 
victim’s reputation online.  They could engage in “Google-bombing” to 
optimize positive posts on a search of a victim’s name.  Groups like 
ReputationDefender have helped victims establish their online presence to 
offset destructive postings.306 
Such a response, however, would be inadequate.  First, it would not remove 
the threats and lies that produce emotional distress and fear.  It would not 
restore the confidentiality of the victim’s Social Security number and other 
sensitive information.  Even in the case of “merely” defamatory attacks, it is 
inconceivable that all damage will be restored.307  Because so many people will 
see the material, some will inevitably miss the victim’s response while others 
will not believe, or only partially believe, it.  In the diffuse world online, the 
shortcomings of any response will be much, much worse. 
When issues are being debated, the failure of a point to connect with its 
counterpoint is less of a concern: some people’s views may be skewed by 
seeing only one side of an argument, while others’ ideas may reflect 
disproportionate exposure to the opposing side.  In the end, society can hope 
the two roughly balance.  When dealing with attacks on someone’s character, 
however, the victim does not have an affirmative case she is trying to convey – 
she is only seeking to dispel the harm from the mob’s attack.  People seeing a 
disproportionate number of her rebuttals will not counterbalance those who 
have seen none. 
Second, the efforts of advocacy groups may be unable to drown out the 
assaults of cyber mobs.  Consider the case of Nicole Catsouras, who died in a 
horrific car crash.308  Gruesome photographs of the carnage appeared on the 
Internet, spreading to over 1500 sites.309  Posters urged cohorts to harass her 
family and facilitated this harassment by providing the family’s home 
address.310  The woman’s family asked sites to remove the pictures but to no 
avail.311  Tracking down the anonymous posters proved impossible for the 
family, and the pictures remained online.312 
Third, instead of slowing down an online mob, counter-measures may 
sustain the life of the attacks.  The very purpose of many online attacks is to 
force victims off the net; the mobs are likely to respond with particular venom 
against a victim who not only stays online but tries to fight back.  A victim 
may plausibly conclude that more people will see the defamatory or private 
material if she responds than if she does not. 
 
306 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
307 Cohen, supra note 207, at 245. 
308 Victoria Murphy Barret, Anonymity & the Net, FORBES, Oct. 15, 2007, at 74. 
309 Id. 
310 Id. 
311 Id. 
312 Id. 
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Fourth, online attacks are vastly more numerous and easier to launch than 
defenses.  The online advocacy groups are hopelessly outnumbered and 
outmatched, and basic collective action theory says they will remain so.313  
Few free or inexpensive resources are available for defending one’s online 
reputation, and the services of groups like ReputationDefender are expensive 
and beyond the means of many victims.314  Even if a victim could afford such 
assistance, anticipating that cost could discourage an individual from 
expressing herself online.  Thus, the fact that some victims of mobs may be 
able to enlist allies does not justify limiting or denying relief to the many who 
cannot. 
Finally, this view ignores the social harm resulting from attacks by online 
mobs.  If expressing opinions online subjects someone to the risk of assault, 
even if the damage is only temporary, the result will change the kinds of 
people who participate in online discourse.  If we believe the Internet is, and 
should remain, a wild west with incivility and brutality as the norm, then those 
who are impervious to such conduct will remain online while the vulnerable 
may not.  To that end, we may get more bull-headed posters and fewer 
thoughtful ones.  An online discourse which systematically under-represents 
people – particularly women and people of color – cannot effectively process 
our various attitudes and convert them into truly democratic decisions. 
4. The Extent of Interference with Protected Expression 
In considering restrictions on the time, place, and manner of expression, the 
Supreme Court has emphasized the availability of alternative avenues for 
expression.315  Although defamation, true threats, and online mobs’ other 
unlawful actions are subject to far more extensive regulation than merely time, 
place, and manner, this reasoning is nonetheless instructive.  None of the 
criminal statutes, tort laws, and civil rights theories discussed here impede or 
even chill the mobs’ expression of their core ideas, whether they be 
disagreement with their targets’ ideas, hatred for their targets, or even hatred of 
women or other classes of people.  In addition, no statutes limit the vehemence 
of those expressions.  They instead further important interests unrelated to the 
suppression of hateful, racist, or sexist speech. 
Although the Court has upheld excluding from public property fully 
protected expressions of political and religious views in ways that sharply 
 
313 See Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on 
Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate 
Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 579 n.1 (2008) (explaining collective action theory as one 
that examines the dynamics of individual behavior in cooperative group settings and 
concludes that individual members of a collective group usually do not act because they 
have the incentive to “free ride” on the efforts of others). 
314 See, e.g., ReputationDefender: Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.reputationdefender.com/faq (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). 
315 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 482 (1988). 
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narrowed their potential audiences,316 none of the remedies proposed here 
would curtail in any way the audience for the mobs’ expressions of 
disagreement.  At the margins, of course, some may be uncertain as to whether 
a particular threat will be considered sufficiently severe to qualify as a true 
threat or whether particular abuse is sufficiently outrageous to be considered an 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.  These problems, however, existed 
in the analog world, and they affect only a tiny fraction of the ways in which 
an idea might be expressed.  Protecting the civil rights of online mobs’ victims 
comes at an extremely small cost to legitimate expression. 
C. First Amendment Doctrine 
1. Criminal and Tort Law 
Threats fall outside the First Amendment’s protection if speakers mean to 
communicate a serious intention to commit an act of unlawful violence against 
particular individuals.317  The speaker need not actually intend to commit a 
violent act because the prohibition of “true threats” protects individuals from 
the fear of violence and the disruption that such fear engenders.318  Once a 
statement meets the “true threat” standard, it no longer qualifies as protected 
speech because it “is so intertwined with violent action that it has essentially 
become conduct.”319 
A “true threat” determination typically depends upon whether a reasonable 
person would consider the statement a serious and unconditional expression of 
intent to inflict bodily harm and not mere hyperbole.320  A person, however, 
cannot escape responsibility merely by combining the threatening language 
 
316 See, e.g., Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 685 
(1992) (upholding a ban on solicitations in publicly operated airport terminals). 
317 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 
388 (1992) (explaining that threats fall outside the First Amendment to “protect[] 
individuals from the fear of violence, from the disruption that fear engenders, and from the 
possibility that the threatened violence will occur”); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 
708 (1969). 
318 Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60. 
319 United States v. Francis, 164 F.3d 120, 123 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). 
320 Watts, 394 U.S. at 705-08 (deeming the statement, “[i]f they ever make me carry a 
rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.” political hyperbole, a “kind of very 
crude offensive method of stating political opposition to the President,” and not a true threat 
because it was made at a protest rally, it had an expressly conditional nature, and it 
prompted listeners to laugh).  Only the Ninth Circuit requires proof that the defendant 
subjectively intended to threaten the victim.  United States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676, 680 (9th 
Cir. 1988).  The remaining circuits apply an objective standard that focuses on whether it 
was reasonably foreseeable to the speaker (or the listener) that the statement would be 
interpreted as expressing a serious intent to hurt another.  E.g., United States v. Syring, 522 
F. Supp. 2d 125, 129 (D.D.C. 2007). 
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with an issue of public concern.321  Courts have upheld online threats as 
unprotected “true threats” even though the defendants never sent the messages 
directly to the recipients.322  Whether statements constitute “true threats” is a 
jury question unless no reasonable jury could find that they amounted to “true 
threats.”323 
Similarly, First Amendment doctrine offers little protection to defamatory 
statements because they offer “such slight social value as a step to truth that 
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social 
interest in order and morality.”324  Statements do, however, enjoy immunity 
from defamation liability if they do not assert or imply verifiable facts.325  To 
 
321 Frederick M. Lawrence, The Collision of Rights in Violence-Conducive Speech, 19 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1333, 1355-56  (1998); see, e.g., Planned Parenthood of 
Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1079-80, 1085 
(9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (holding that “Wanted” posters and a portion of the Nuremberg 
Files website that listed abortion doctors’ home and work addresses went “well beyond the 
political message” that “abortionists are killers who deserve death” and were true threats 
because even though the posters and website contained no explicitly threatening language, 
they connotated the message “You’re Wanted or You’re Guilty; You’ll be shot or killed” in 
light of the prior murders of physicians who appeared on Wanted posters); United States v. 
Bellrichard, 994 F.2d 1318, 1322 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Khorrami, 895 F.2d 1186, 
1192-94 (7th Cir. 1990) (upholding a conviction where a defendant sent a “Wanted” poster 
with pictures of Israeli officials to the Jewish National Fund headquarters); Syring, 522 F. 
Supp. 2d at 126, 131 (refusing to dismiss a 18 U.S.C § 875(c) (2000) indictment because it 
was a fact question for the jury, where a defendant sent e-mails and voicemails to a victim’s 
workplace that said “[named individual’s] anti-American statements . . . are abhorrent . . . . 
The only good Lebanese is a dead Lebanese”). 
322 See, e.g., United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944, 952-53 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding 
a § 875(c) conviction where a defendant posted a threat on his website to kill a company’s 
process server and uploaded a picture of the company’s attorney and her daughter, along 
with her home address, while a voiceover clip played from a movie that featured the stalking 
of an attorney and his family); United States v. Morales, 272 F.3d 284, 288 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(affirming a § 875(c) conviction where the defendant sent instant messages under the name 
Ed Harris to a third party unconnected to the defendant’s high school stating that he “will 
kill” teachers and students at his school, because the defendant repeated his threats several 
times, gave no indication that he was joking, and admitted that he attempted to refer to 
Columbine High School killer Eric Harris). 
323 See, e.g., United States v. Zavalidroga, No. 97-10290, 1998 WL 403361, at *1 (9th 
Cir. July 7, 1998); United States v. Whiffen, 121 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 1997). 
324 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); see, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free 
Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245-46 (2002) (explaining that “freedom of speech has its 
limits” and “does not embrace certain categories of speech, including defamation”); 
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952). 
325 Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1990).  The Supreme Court 
explained: “If a speaker says, ‘In my opinion, John Jones is a liar,’ he implies a knowledge 
of facts which lead to the conclusion that Jones told an untruth,” and the comment can be 
actionable.  Id. at 18.  By contrast, if the speaker says a person “shows his abysmal 
ignorance by accepting the teachings of Marx and Lenin,” the First Amendment bars 
  
2009] CYBER CIVIL RIGHTS 109 
 
that end, courts prohibit defamation actions based on loose, figurative language 
that no reasonable person in that context would believe presented facts.326  For 
example, criticizing another’s views in an online debate has been understood 
as constituting privileged opinion and not verifiable facts.327 
Nonetheless, anonymous message-board postings are not immune from 
defamation liability simply because they are too outrageous to be believed.328  
A California court explained: 
Even if the exchange that takes place on these message boards is typically 
freewheeling and irreverent, we do not agree that it is exempt from 
established legal and social norms. . . . We would be doing a great 
disservice to the Internet audience if we were to conclude that all speech 
on Internet bulletin boards was so suspect that it could not be defamatory 
as a matter of law.329 
If these damaging statements here were indeed false, many would not enjoy 
immunity from liability – they could reasonably be understood as asserting 
verifiable facts.  For instance, statements concerning a victim’s specific actions 
or conditions, such as a stay in a drug rehabilitation center, an infectious 
disease, or a specific LSAT score, seem factual, and thus, a plaintiff could 
prove them true or false for defamation purposes.330 
 
recovery because the statement cannot be objectively verified.  Id. at 20.  For example, 
calling a play a “rip-off, a fraud, a scandal, a snake-oil job” constituted hyperbole that 
deserved constitutional protection.  Phantom Touring, Inc. v. Affiliated Publ’ns, 953 F.2d 
724, 728 (1st Cir. 1992). 
326 See, e.g., Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 
U.S. 264, 284-86 (1974) (holding that the use of the word “traitor” to define a worker who 
crossed a picket line was not actionable). 
327 See, e.g., Nicosia v. De Rooy, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1101 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (finding 
that an online debate between parties in a legal dispute did not constitute verifiable facts 
because the audience would anticipate efforts by the parties to persuade others of their 
position through fiery epithets and hyperbole); Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 248-
50 (Ct. App. 2008) (finding statements in a defamation suit not actionable where the 
defendant posted statements accusing the plaintiff of having a “fake medical degree” and 
being a “crook” with “poor feminine hygiene” because the statements were part of a 
“[h]eated discussion” between the parties on an online message board). 
328 See, e.g., Varian Med. Sys., Inc. v. Delfino, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 325, 337 (Ct. App. 2003) 
(rejecting defendant’s argument that his online statements calling the plaintiffs liars who 
suffered from mental illnesses and had sex with their employers were opinions or hyperbole 
because “no reasonable person would take a typical anonymous and outrageous posting as a 
true statement of fact”), rev’d on other grounds, 106 P.3d 958 (Cal. 2005); Super Future 
Equities, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, 553 F. Supp. 2d 680, 688 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (refusing to 
consider online statements that accused the plaintiff of engaging in particular conduct as 
protected opinions because they could be understood as verifiable facts). 
329 Varian, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 337. 
330 See Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 256-57 (D. Conn. 2008) (allowing 
plaintiffs to pierce defendant’s right to speak anonymously where the plaintiff presented a 
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Moreover, plaintiffs need not prove “actual malice” if the alleged 
defamation involves the personal affairs of private individuals.331  First 
Amendment doctrine requires plaintiffs to show “actual malice” only if the 
plaintiffs are “public figures”332 or if the statements concern matters on which 
the public has a justified and important interest.333  For instance, in Time, Inc. 
v. Firestone, the Court found no need for proof of “actual malice” in a 
defamation case concerning the plaintiff’s divorce because the dissolution of a 
marriage does not involve a matter of public interest, even though the marital 
difficulties of wealthy individuals might be of some interest to the public, and 
because the plaintiff did not freely choose to publicize issues related to her 
married life.334 
Few of the targets of online mobs are likely to be “public figures” even for 
special purposes: their influence is simply too minimal to suggest they “have 
assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society.”335  A person 
whose published writings reach a relatively small category of people in a 
particular field is not a public figure.336  Nor do the public controversies that 
surround attacks, and victims’ attempts to defend themselves, render them 
public figures: “[T]hose charged with defamation cannot, by their own 
conduct, create their own defense by making the claimant a public figure.”337  
Moreover, the assaults often involve highly personal matters on which the 
public lacks an important interest.  If the public does not have an important 
interest in learning about the divorce of a wealthy couple, it surely has no 
interest in charges of private individuals’ sexually transmitted diseases or 
mental illnesses.  Thus, victims such as students and bloggers would not have 
to prove actual malice to pursue defamation claims. 
 
prima facie case of defamation in which the defendant falsely claimed that plaintiff, a 
female law student, had a gay affair with a law school administrator, because the statement 
would harm the plaintiff’s reputation). 
331 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762-63 (1985) 
(finding no “actual malice” requirement in a defamation case about an erroneous credit 
report issued for plaintiff company because it did not concern an issue in which the public 
had a justified and important interest); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453-55 (1976). 
332 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (refusing to require actual 
malice in a defamation case involving a private figure who did not thrust himself into the 
vortex of a public issue). 
333 Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (explaining that the burden of 
proving “actual malice” is predicated in large part on the assumption that public figures 
have sufficient access to the media to defend themselves); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254, 266 (1964). 
334 Time, Inc., 424 U.S. at 453-54. 
335 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 (refusing to deem a well-known attorney as a public 
figure). 
336 Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979). 
337 Id. 
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Free speech doctrine would also not limit emotional distress claims, as the 
attacks here mainly involve private individuals, rather than public figures.  
Only in cases involving “public debate about public figures” does First 
Amendment doctrine require proof that “the publication contains a false 
statement of fact which was made with ‘actual malice.’”338  As with 
defamation claims, the actual malice standard does not apply to a private 
person whose emotional distress concerns personal matters.339  Many of the 
women targeted online, such as the female law students, would not be 
considered public figures because they never sought to attract the public’s 
attention.  Although some victims, such as Kathy Sierra, might be considered 
public figures due to their especial prominence, the assaults do not address 
issues of public concern and thus may be actionable without showing actual 
malice. 
2. Civil Rights Law 
Civil rights violations have a dual character.  On one hand, they single out 
people of color, religious minorities, women, and other traditionally subjugated 
groups for abuse that wreaks special harm on the victims and their 
communities.  On the other hand, they explicitly or implicitly communicate a 
racist or otherwise bigoted viewpoint.  The Court has made clear that the First 
Amendment poses no obstacle to punishing a defendant for his decision to 
target vulnerable individuals for abuse because of their gender or race, and for 
the grave harm the targeting of vulnerable individuals inflicts.  Moreover, the 
Court has refused to allow perpetrators to immunize actions by adding some 
explicit expressions.  The Court has, however, rejected attempts to proscribe 
abusive expressions solely because their content may be more offensive to 
vulnerable people.  This viewpoint discrimination restriction poses little 
 
338 See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53, 56 (1988) (finding no 
actionable intentional infliction of emotional distress claim where a magazine advertisement 
suggested the plaintiff, a nationally known minister, had a “drunken incestuous rendezvous 
with his mother in an outhouse”).  The actual malice standard does apply to private 
individuals who have thrust themselves into the public sphere.  E.g., Gilbert v. Sykes, 53 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 752, 762-63 (Ct. App. 2007) (requiring proof of actual malice in an emotional 
distress case involving online criticism of a plastic surgeon, because the surgeon had cast 
himself into the public sphere “by appearing on local television shows[,] . . . writing 
numerous articles in medical journals and beauty magazines, . . . [and testifying] as an 
expert witness”). 
339 See, e.g., Inland Mediation Bd. v. City of Pomona, 158 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1158 n.30 
(C.D. Cal. 2001); State v. Carpenter, 171 P.3d 41, 56 (Alaska 2007).  To be sure, the First 
Amendment would bar an emotional distress claim based solely on the content of 
constitutionally protected statements, such as privileged opinion.  Hustler, 485 U.S. at 55-
56.  The emotional distress claims envisioned here, however, would not be based upon 
protected opinion, but rather upon intimidating and frightening threats of physical violence, 
the posting of Social Security numbers, and alleged lies about verifiable facts, such as a 
victim’s sexual health. 
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obstacle to the pursuit of federal and state antidiscrimination actions against 
online mobs. 
The two leading cases in this area are R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul340 and 
Wisconsin v. Mitchell.341  In R.A.V., the city criminalized conduct that an 
individual “knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or 
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender.”342  
The Court held that this ordinance unconstitutionally discriminated on the 
basis of the content of certain offensive expressions – expressions that 
offensively demonstrated bigoted ideas were proscribed by the ordinance, yet 
those that gave offense in other ways were not.343  The Court explained: 
Displays containing abusive invective, no matter how vicious or severe, 
are permissible unless they are addressed to one of the specified 
disfavored topics.  Those who wish to use “fighting words” in connection 
with other ideas – to express hostility, for example, on the basis of 
political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality – are not 
covered.  The First Amendment does not permit St. Paul to impose 
special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored 
subjects.344 
The government cannot discriminate on the basis of the ideas expressed, 
even within categories of speech and conduct that the First Amendment does 
not protect independently.345  Thus, it can prohibit all obscene or defamatory 
statements, or all fighting words, but not only those conveying a particular type 
of message independent of their obscene, defamatory, or incendiary 
character.346 
The Court emphasized the narrowness of its findings by explicitly upholding 
several civil rights laws prohibiting sexual harassment in the workplace, even 
though that type of harassment is commonly accomplished through expressions 
that are far more likely to be misogynistic than feminist.347  It explained that 
Congress directed Title VII’s prohibition on “sexually derogatory ‘fighting 
words’” at conduct and thus its “content-based subcategory of a proscribable 
class of speech [is] swept up incidentally within the reach of a statute directed 
at conduct rather than speech.”348  Also acceptable are laws that focus on those 
expressions most likely to cause harm, so long as those laws do not define 
 
340 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
341 508 U.S. 476 (1993). 
342 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 380 (citing ST. PAUL, MINN., BIAS-MOTIVATED CRIME ORDINANCE 
§ 292.02 (1990)). 
343 Id. at 391. 
344 Id. 
345 Id. at 383-84. 
346 Id. at 384. 
347 Id. at 389. 
348 Id. 
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harmfulness in terms of the viewpoint expressed.349  More generally, the Court 
explained that “[w]here the government does not target conduct on the basis of 
its expressive content, acts are not shielded from regulation merely because 
they express a discriminatory idea or philosophy.”350 
A year later, in Mitchell v. Wisconsin, a unanimous Court confirmed that 
R.A.V.’s holding was narrow indeed.  Mitchell involved a Wisconsin statute 
allowing harsher sentences for certain crimes if the perpetrator selected his or 
her victim “because of . . . race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, 
national origin or ancestry.”351  A unanimous Court rejected the defendant’s 
claim that the statute discriminated against him on the basis of his racist 
views.352  It noted that the additional penalties attached to the defendant’s 
discriminatory intent because of his conduct, not his bigoted ideas.353 
The Court analogized the Wisconsin statute to federal and state 
antidiscrimination laws, which, it explained, were immune from First 
Amendment challenge.354  It pointed to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as examples from civil rights law of “permissible 
content-neutral regulation of conduct.”355  The Court noted that “whereas the 
ordinance struck down in R.A.V. was explicitly directed at expression (i.e., 
‘speech’ or ‘messages’), the statute in this case is aimed at conduct unprotected 
by the First Amendment.”356  It found Wisconsin was justified in singling out 
“bias-inspired conduct because this conduct is thought to inflict greater 
individual and societal harm. . . . The State’s desire to redress these perceived 
harms provides an adequate explanation for its penalty-enhancement provision 
over and above mere disagreement with offenders’ beliefs or biases.”357  The 
Court underscored that “[t]he First Amendment . . . does not prohibit the 
evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or to prove 
motive or intent.”358 
Applying civil rights statutes to the attacks of cyber mobs falls clearly on the 
Mitchell side of this line.  The statutes’ proscriptions turn on an online mob’s 
discriminatory choice of victim and the distinct harm to victims and society 
that the defendant’s abusive conduct produces, rather than on the opinions that 
either the victims or the attackers express.359  Seeking to prevent a woman 
from maintaining an income-generating blog through threats and denial-of-
 
349 Id. at 388. 
350 Id. at 390. 
351 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 509 U.S. 476, 480 (1993). 
352 Id. at 487. 
353 Id. at 487-88. 
354 Id. at 487. 
355 Id. 
356 Id. (citation omitted). 
357 Id. at 487-88. 
358 Id. at 489. 
359 See Lawrence, Resolving Paradox, supra note 280, at 721. 
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service attacks because she is a woman is equally offensive, and equally 
proscribed, no matter the perpetrator’s specific views.  Aiming to prevent a 
person of color from securing gainful employment because of her race is no 
more or less offensive depending on the nature of the lies or the private 
information disseminated.  Many online attacks have included racist, sexist, or 
other bigoted language; others have not.  When the law punishes online 
attackers due to the special severity of the social harm produced by targeting 
these classes of victims on bases of gender or race, and not due to the 
particular opinions the victims express, no First Amendment values are 
implicated. 
R.A.V. confirmed “that nonverbal expressive activity can be banned because 
of the action it entails, but not because of the ideas it expresses.”360  The 
application of civil rights laws to online mobs clearly targets actions – the 
interference with job opportunities through threats, damaging statements, and 
technological attacks – and is indifferent to the mobs’ ideas.  Indeed, even if 
these laws did single out some sub-types of proscribed speech, such as severe 
threats or especially injurious defamation, the Court noted that it would raise 
no First Amendment concerns.  The Court explained: 
When the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the very 
reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable, no significant 
danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination exists.  Such a reason, having 
been adjudged neutral enough to support exclusion of the entire class of 
speech from First Amendment protection, is also neutral enough to form 
the basis of distinction within the class.361 
Virginia v. Black362 provides further support for this reading of R.A.V.  In 
Black, the Court held that a state “may ban cross burning carried out with the 
intent to intimidate,” but struck down a provision in Virginia’s statute that 
treated all cross-burnings as prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate.363  
The Court explicitly reaffirmed R.A.V.’s holding that the government may 
prohibit low-value speech across-the-board, but not specific speech that 
 
360 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 385 (1992). 
361 Id. at 388.  The Court found nothing problematic about banning only the most 
prurient obscenity and threats to the most senior public officials, or allowing states to 
regulate price advertising in an industry deemed particularly prone to fraud.  Id.  It 
explained that a federal statute criminalizing only threats of violence made against the 
President would be upheld because it serves the reasons why such threats fall “outside the 
First Amendment ([e.g.,] protecting individuals from the fear of violence, from the 
disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened violence will 
occur)” in the first place.  Id.  On the other hand, a federal law that only criminalized threats 
of violence mentioning the President’s policy on aid to inner cities would be 
unconstitutional as its content discrimination would not fall within the reasons why threats 
of violence are outside the First Amendment.  Id. 
362 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
363 Id. at 347-48. 
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discriminates on the basis of message.364  The Court distinguished cross-
burning with the intent to intimidate, which it deemed a proscribable “true 
threat,” from cross-burning for other purposes, which it held constituted a 
protected expression of a viewpoint.365  Thus, far from being immune from 
scrutiny, Black confirms that actors’ motives may be decisive in the 
classification of their actions.366  This is precisely the point that Mitchell made. 
Attempting to prevent anyone from making a living is offensive.  By 
contrast, attempting to prevent someone from making a living because of her 
race is a civil rights violation.  Federal and state antidiscrimination laws focus 
on the perpetrator’s discriminatory intent in targeting the victim and the special 
harm that results, not on any views that either the perpetrator or victim might 
have, and thus the laws’ application here would not offend the First 
Amendment.  As such, their application to online mobs poses no First 
Amendment problems under current doctrine. 
IV. THE ROLE OF WEBSITE OPERATORS 
Throughout history, technological advances have created large, successful 
business entities.  Those harmed by new technologies see these entities as 
fitting sources of compensation for their injuries.  As new technologies come 
to permeate society, these large businesses inevitably facilitate anti-social, as 
well as pro-social, behavior.  For instance, the building of canals, railroads, and 
reservoirs at the dawn of the Industrial Revolution contributed much to the 
economy, yet also inflicted waves of destruction on adjoining property owners 
and towns, much of it wholly unnecessary.367 
The law’s reaction to claims against large actors for new types of harms 
typically goes through three distinct phases.  First, it recognizes the new form 
of harm, but not the benefit that the new technology has occasioned.368  This 
drives the law to adapt existing theories of liability to reach that harm.  Second, 
after the technology’s benefits become apparent, the law abruptly reverses 
course, seeing its earlier awards of liability as threats to technological progress 
and granting sweeping protection to the firms in the new industry.369  Finally, 
 
364 Id. at 361-63. 
365 Id. at 365. 
366 See Lawrence, Evolving Role, supra note 206, at 269. 
367 See HORWITZ, supra note 29, at 71-74. 
368 See id. at 85 (explaining that “at the beginning of the nineteenth century, there was a 
general private law presumption in favor of compensation”). 
369 Citron, supra note 43, at 273-76.  For instance, courts in the newly industrialized 
America refused to follow the British decision of Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) 3 L.R.E. & I. 
App. 330 (H.L.), which adopted a strict-liability approach for damage caused by bursting 
reservoirs, because of a fear that the cost of faultless accidents would preclude the growth of 
fledgling industry.  Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442, 448 (1873) (finding Rylands antithetical 
to “progress and improvement”); FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 351 (explaining how absolute 
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once the technology becomes better established, the law recognizes that not all 
liability awards threaten its survival.370  It then separates activities that are 
indispensable to the pursuit of the new industry from behavior that causes 
unnecessary harm to third parties.371  This is, for example, what the celebrated 
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.372 case accomplished and much of the 
reason the negligence standard emerged.  As the new technology progresses 
and becomes more familiar, the law refines the distinction between acceptable 
and unacceptable harms, at times setting liability rules to drive the 
development of less destructive means of carrying out the necessary functions. 
This familiar pattern can be seen with regard to the liability of relatively 
large online actors for harm inflicted through their facilities.  The first, hyper-
vigilant, stage can be seen in a few early cases, notably Stratton-Oakmont, Inc. 
v. Prodigy Co., in which courts found ISPs liable for offensive material that 
came through their portals.373  Ironically, Prodigy’s liability was based in part 
on its attempt to screen out troubling material, causing the court to reason by 
analogy from edited newspapers that incur responsibility as publishers for their 
content.374  The courts’ use of an ISP’s good faith remedial measures to 
establish liability disturbed Congress, prompting its passage of § 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996 to immunize such actions.375 
This legislation merely checked a particular excess of law’s hyper-vigilant 
stage.  The law reached the second, hyper-protective stage later, as some courts 
read § 230 to grant sweeping immunity far beyond what its words and context 
supported.376  This reaction reached its ironic apogee when courts read a 
 
liability rules, like that imposed in Rylands, were initially rejected in the United States 
because they risked strangling the economy). 
370 See, e.g., Citron, supra note 43, at 276-77 (explaining that a strong majority of U.S. 
courts adopted the strict-liability approach of Rylands at the turn of the twentieth century 
because it no longer seemed enterprise-inhibiting). 
371 Id. 
372 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928). 
373 Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co, 1995 WL 323710, at *4-5 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. May 24, 1995). 
374 Id. at *4. 
375 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2000) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service 
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider.”). 
376 See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333-34 (4th Cir. 1997).  The 
Communications Decency Act consisted of a broad attack on sexually explicit material 
disseminated through various media.  S. REP. NO. 104-23, at 59 (1995)  When Congress 
addressed private actors, as it did in § 230, it was to “encourage telecommunications and 
information service providers to deploy new technologies and policies” to block offensive 
material.  Id.  Representatives Christopher Cox and Ron Wyden, who proposed § 230 in a 
floor amendment, focused on removing impediments to “Good Samaritan” ISPs 
supplementing the law’s protections against obscene and indecent material.  H.R. REP. NO. 
104-223, at 3, 14 (1995).  The Cox-Wyden amendment immunized “action voluntarily taken 
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provision offering “[p]rotection for private blocking and screening of offensive 
material”377 to shield operators of sites purveying precisely such material.378  
These efforts to read a sweeping immunity into § 230 despite its language and 
purpose have prevented the courts from exploring what standard of care ought 
to apply to ISPs and website operators. 
This Part seeks to help move the law to the third, more analytical stage.  It 
opposes holding ISPs liable merely because of their deep pockets and 
inevitable proximity to harm.  It is sympathetic to the results, if not the 
reasoning, of many cases rejecting liability.379  On the other hand, it equally 
opposes blanket grants of immunity that leave innocent victims of cyber civil 
rights violations without effective recourse.  Instead, this Part seeks to establish 
a reasonable standard of care that will reduce opportunities for abuses without 
interfering with the further development of a vibrant Internet or unintentionally 
converting innocent ISPs or website operators into involuntary insurers of 
those injured through their sites.  Approaching the problem in this manner – as 
a question of setting an appropriate duty of care – more readily allows for 
differentiating between disparate kinds of online actors by setting different 
rules for websites established to facilitate mob attacks, and those large ISPs 
that beneficially link millions to the Internet.  Reaching this stage, however, 
requires abandoning the hyper-protective stage in which many courts are 
currently mired. 
 
in good faith to restrict access to material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, 
lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether 
or not such material is constitutionally protected.”  Id. at 14.  This immunity would combat 
the problem created by holding ISPs liable for inexact screening – namely, that it 
discourages intermediaries from engaging in screening in order to distance themselves from 
the content on their sites, and hence any liability.  Susan Freiwald, Comparative 
Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace: The Case of Intermediary Liability for Defamation, 14 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 569, 595-96 (2001).   The absence of self-screening was antithetical to 
supporters of the Communications Decency Act, who believed that controlling the volume 
of noxious material on the Internet exceeded the capacity of public regulatory agencies.  141 
CONG. REC. H8469-70 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (remarks of Rep. Cox).  Supporters believed 
that reducing objectionable material on the Internet depended upon ISPs acting as Good 
Samaritans, voluntarily screening out as much offensive content as possible.  Id.  Given this 
history, courts could have limited § 230’s application to intermediaries and websites that 
engaged in good faith, though incomplete, monitoring.  Instead, they interpreted § 230 as 
absolving intermediaries and website operators of all responsibility for users’ actions, even 
those that knew about and ignored indecent material.  E.g., Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil 
Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 669, 671-72 (7th Cir. 2008). 
377 47 U.S.C. § 230. 
378 See, e.g., Chi. Lawyers’ Comm., 519 F.3d at 669, 671-72 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that 
a website, designated a non-publisher by § 230(c)(1), could not be held liable under 42 
U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2006) for the posting of discriminatory housing advertisements). 
379 See, e.g., Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 983 (10th 
Cir. 2000) (rejecting a suit against an ISP for alleged negligence in making available stock 
information concededly provided by known third parties). 
  
118 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:61 
 
Section A demonstrates that granting website operators blanket immunity 
would be anomalous and undesirable, effectively shielding most online mobs 
from responsibility for the harm they do.  Section B then considers how we 
ought to construe the standard of care for ISPs and website operators. 
A. Should Website Operators Have Immunity? 
Participants in online mobs may be civilly and criminally liable on a number 
of bases.380  In practice, however, victims of online mobs may be unable to 
press their claims against posters who cannot be identified.  This can occur if 
the posters used anonymizing technologies or if the websites hosting the 
attacks failed to track IP addresses.  To be sure, as Jonathan Zittrain points out, 
“[i]t’s a cat and mouse game of forensics, and if people don’t go to some effort 
to stay anonymous, it’s frequently possible to figure out who they are.”381  All 
too often, however, abusive posters cover their tracks. 
Consider the AutoAdmit case, where the plaintiffs have been unable to 
identify most of their attackers because AutoAdmit does not log visitors’ IP 
addresses.382  Although the court has ordered expedited discovery to allow the 
plaintiffs to locate the anonymous posters, finding them may be impossible due 
to the fact that ISPs routinely delete data every sixty days.383  Plaintiffs have 
posted several messages on AutoAdmit “requesting that defendants come 
forward for the purpose of being served with the complaint.”384  Not 
surprisingly, most have not responded.385 
Efforts to rein in online mobs may falter if the posters cannot be held 
responsible for their torts and crimes.386  Generally, the operators of destructive 
websites either have information that could identify abusive posters or have 
made a conscious decision not to obtain or retain that information.387  Some 
 
380 See supra Part II.A.2. 
381 Posting of Amir Efrati to Wall Street Journal Law Blog, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/01/30/subpoena-allowed-in-autoadmit-suit/ (Jan. 30, 2008, 
9:08). 
382 Posting of Nate Anderson to Ars Technica 
http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20080127-yale-students-unable-to-identify-
anonymous-forum-bashers.html (Jan. 27, 2008, 22:39). 
383 Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law In Support of Motion for Expedited Discovery at 12 
n.80, Doe I v. Ciolli, No. 3:07CV00909(CFD) (D. Conn. Jan. 24, 2008), available at 
http://s.wsj.net/public/resources/documents/WSJ_DEF_MemoofLawreM_012408.pdf 
[hereinafter Memo for Expedited Discovery]. 
384 Id. at 11. 
385 Anderson, supra note 382.  At least one defendant has come forward and filed a 
motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum issued to AutoAdmit’s ISP for information relating 
to his identity and a motion to proceed anonymously in the litigation.  Doe I v. Individuals, 
561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 250, 257 (D. Conn. 2008).  Both motions were denied.  Id. 
386 See, e.g., Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 656 (7th Cir. 2003) (describing the 
dismissal of anonymous online abusers for the inability to serve). 
387 JuicyCampus.com and AutoAdmit.com are prominent examples of such an approach. 
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website operators function as crowd leaders, influencing the mobs’ 
destructiveness.388  Deterring websites devoted to abusive attacks on 
individuals plays a crucial role in inhibiting a destructive mob’s coordination 
and efficacy.  Thus, holding accountable the operators of websites which 
facilitate anonymous attacks may hold the key to protecting the civil rights of 
the women, people of color, and others set upon by online mobs. 
By contrast, broad immunity for operators of abusive websites would 
eliminate incentives for better behavior by those in the best position to 
minimize harm.389  As Daniel Solove notes, such immunity “can foster 
irresponsibility.”390  With blanket immunity, site operators would have no 
reason to take down false or injurious material391 or to collect and retain the 
identities of posters.392  As a result, objectionable posts remain online and 
searchable by employers, often migrating across the web to become effectively 
irretrievable, while plaintiffs continue to be unable to find and recover 
damages from wrongdoers. 
Supporters of blanket immunity for website operators have several 
responses to this argument.  First, some contend that holding website operators 
liable is unnecessary, as victims can identify and sue members of online 
mobs.393  On some occasions, particularly if victims sue very quickly and 
persuade the court to order expedited discovery, they may be able to obtain 
records identifying mob members before ISPs routinely purge their records 
after sixty days.394  To be sure, the plaintiffs in the AutoAdmit case have 
 
388 See supra Part I.B. 
389 See Doug Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable, 
14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 221, 224 (2006); Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe 
Harbors 14 (Stanford Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 979836, 2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=979836. 
390 SOLOVE, supra note 4, at 159. 
391 Lemley, supra note 389, at 16. 
392 See id.; Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997).  Zeran, for 
example, involved an anonymous poster who offered t-shirts that made fun of the Oklahoma 
City terrorist bombing less than a week after it occurred, and said the t-shirts were available 
at the plaintiff’s phone number.  Id. at 329.  As a result, Zeran received a constant stream of 
abusive calls and death threats.  Id.  Although AOL eventually removed the postings, it 
never identified the perpetrator.  Id. 
393 This argument against liability is the equivalent of the now-discredited Fellow 
Servant Rule which, during the Industrial Revolution, absolved employers of liability for 
workers’ injuries most proximately caused by another worker.  FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at  
223.  Because other workers were almost always more directly involved with injured 
workers than factory managers, this rule effectively precluded meaningful recoveries for 
injuries and left unsafe working conditions undeterred.  Id. at 224.  Here, ignoring the 
website operators’ roles because the anonymous posters’ behavior is more spectacular is 
likely to prevent recovery in most cases and leave online mobs largely undeterred. 
394 See Memo for Expedited Discovery, supra note 383, at 12 n.80. 
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identified a few of the posters who attacked them.395  Nevertheless, the great 
majority of defendants seem unlikely to be identified. 
Absolving website operators of responsibility when they create sites to 
facilitate anonymous online attacks will largely foil recovery and eliminate 
deterrence.  Most victims are likely never to have their day in court if website 
operators are free to facilitate anonymous posting, as victims are typically 
ordinary individuals unsophisticated in the legal system, the attorneys they 
consult may be unaware of the data destruction practices that make filing 
rapidly and seeking expedited discovery so urgent, and judges may not grasp 
the need to act with such speed at the outset of litigation.  Without liability of 
website operators, victims of online mobs face a de facto statute of limitations 
of less than sixty days, far less than that applied to other plaintiffs with similar 
claims.396 
Second, some fear over-deterrence: the concern that website operators 
would automatically remove posts that may stir complaints and hence chill 
speech, even if the complaints are frivolous.397  This concern is real and merits 
consideration in crafting the substantive expectations for website operators.  
Speculation about possible over-deterrence of speech, however, is not a 
legitimate basis for immunizing a broad class of destructive behavior that itself 
chills important speech.  Any time the law acts to deter destructive behavior, 
over-deterrence is possible.  Even a well-balanced policy may over-deter on 
some occasions and under-deter on others.  The acceptability of those 
respective errors depends on the values we attach to the problematic conduct 
and to the potential harm.  Eliminating all deterrence based on an 
unsubstantiated fear that some beneficial conduct might be over-deterred 
completely devalues the injuries of the women, people of color, and other 
vulnerable individuals targeted by online mobs.  Any over-deterrence – or 
continued under-deterrence – can be assessed and offset by adjusting the 
standard of liability, as the Supreme Court did in New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan.398  Other nations, such as Great Britain and Ireland, do not immunize 
operators for website content produced by third parties and yet still generate 
vibrant online discourse.399 
A third possible argument for immunizing website operators is to discourage 
litigation.  To be sure, other areas of Internet law seek alternatives to 
 
395 Plaintiffs recently located an ISP with identifying information on one poster and have 
previously identified five others.  The district court upheld a subpoena duces tecum for 
those records.  Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 257 (D. Conn 2008). 
396 This rule also could promote unnecessary litigation by compelling victims to sue at 
the first sign of trouble without allowing significant time for investigation or negotiation. 
397 SOLOVE, supra note 4, at 1243; Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333. 
398 376 U.S. 254, 279-83 (1964) (imposing a heightened standard for defamation 
involving public figures as opposed to private individuals). 
399 See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Harmonizing Cybertort Law for Europe 
and America, 5 J. HIGH TECH. L. 13, 47-49 (2005). 
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litigation.400  These alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, however, 
address problems in which ex post remedies are relatively effective and where 
deterrence is not vital.  Online mobs, however, do not operate in good faith.  If 
undeterred, they will continue their attacks, quite willing to have some postings 
removed – often only after their victims suffer irreparable reputational injuries 
and the malicious postings have spread across the Internet.  Avoidance of 
unnecessary litigation is a legitimate and important goal, but it too is best 
addressed in setting the standard of conduct expected from website operators. 
Finally, some believe immunizing website operators is essential to preserve 
anonymity, which they view as vital to free expression on the Internet.401  They 
may invoke the role of websites such as Wikileaks.org to facilitate political 
dissidence against oppressive regimes or analogize to important roles played 
offline by “anonymous” persons, such as investigative journalists’ sources.402  
These parallels, however, are inapt.  In some instances, many “anonymous” 
actors are not, in fact, anonymous, but rather have undisclosed identities.  No 
responsible newspaper publishes material based on sources whose identity it 
does not know.  Similarly, although the Supreme Court has rejected thinly 
supported demands for the production of dissident groups’ membership lists,403 
it has never suggested that authorities or private litigants could not obtain the 
identities of persons reasonably suspected of unlawful activities.404  Freedom 
of expression has never depended on the absolute ability of speakers to prevent 
themselves from being identified and held responsible for activities the state 
 
400 Frank Pasquale, Asterisk Revisited: Debating a Right of Reply on Search Results, 3 J. 
BUS. & TECH. L. 61, 64 (2008) (arguing that informal mechanisms can be an effective first 
step towards resolving online disputes).  Pasquale offers informal processes as a first-step 
towards accountability in cases involving disputed search engine results.  Id.  For instance, 
the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy resolves domain names disputes.  Id.  See generally 
Jeffrey M. Samuels & Linda B. Samuels, Internet Domain Names: The Uniform Dispute 
Resolution Policy, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 885 (2003).  Additionally, eBay’s internal 
administrative processes manage disputes among individuals without expensive litigation.  
Pasquale, supra, at 65; see also Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, A Quick and 
Inexpensive System for Resolving Peer-to-Peer Copyright Disputes, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 1, 3-4 (2005) (proposing an amendment to the copyright statute that gives a 
copyright owner “the option to enforce her copyrights either by pursuing g a civil copyright 
infringement claim in federal court or by pursuing a claim in an administrative dispute 
resolution proceeding before an administrative law judge in the Copyright Office”). 
401 See SOLOVE, supra note 4, at 140. 
402 Similarly, Congress is considering the proposed Global Online Free Expression Act to 
ensure the anonymity of political dissidents from oppressive regimes.  CTR. FOR 
DEMOCRACY & TECH., ANALYSIS OF THE GLOBAL ONLINE FREE EXPRESSION ACT OF 2008, at 
1 (2008), http://www.cdt.org/international/censorship/20080505gofa.pdf. 
403 Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 527 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. 
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958). 
404 Indeed, it has gone much further, allowing the state to obtain the Ku Klux Klan’s 
membership list to deter violence.  New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63,  
72 (1928). 
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may properly prohibit.  As Professor Tribe notes, “secrecy often seems the 
shield of dangerous and irresponsible designs.”405 
B. On What Bases Should Website Operators Be Liable? 
The Ninth Circuit has recently noted: 
The Internet is no longer a fragile new means of communication that 
could easily be smothered in the cradle by overzealous enforcement of 
laws and regulations applicable to brick-and-mortar businesses.  Rather, it 
has become a dominant – perhaps the preeminent – means through which 
commerce is conducted.  And its vast reach into the lives of millions is 
exactly why we must be careful not to exceed the scope of the immunity 
provided by Congress and thus give online businesses an unfair 
advantage over their real-world counterparts, which must comply with 
laws of general applicability.406 
On the other hand, rejecting website operators’ extravagant claims of immunity 
should not lead to a regression to the hyper-vigilant response to web 
technology represented by Prodigy.  Instead, it should open the door to the 
reasoned development of an appropriate standard of care.407  The Seventh 
Circuit, skeptical about assertions of blanket immunity under § 230(c)(1) and 
echoing many of the concerns raised above, undertook such an inquiry.408  It 
failed, however, to appreciate the important differences between ISPs and 
other communications media in allowing wrongdoers to conceal their identity 
and escape liability for their actions.409 
Treating website operators as distributors of defamatory material could 
require them to remove offensive posts when notified by victims.410  In 
practice, however, notice-and-takedown regimes have not worked well in other 
 
405 TRIBE, supra note 285, at 1019. 
406 Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com, L.L.C., 521 F.3d 1157, 1164-65 n.15 (9th 
Cir. 2008). 
407 In particular, because some cases have involved non-anonymous or only thinly veiled 
posters, and because courts have so focused on liability for developing offensive material to 
address overbroad readings of 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), they have given scant consideration to 
liability for helping online malefactors escape liability.  See, e.g., id. at 1174-75. 
408 Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 659-62 (7th Cir. 2003). 
409 See id. 
410 Cf. Posting of Orin Kerr to The Volokh Conspiracy, 
http://volokh.com/posts/1176705254.shtml (Apr. 16, 2007, 17:11) (suggesting that website 
operators could de-index malicious postings so that they would not be searchable).  Website 
operators can use common Web protocols to request that search engines do not index 
particular pages.  Under this approach, site operators would either take full responsibility for 
content on their sites or keep it out of search engines to mitigate the harm to a victim’s 
privacy and reputation.  Id. 
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contexts, such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.411  The difficulty of 
such a regime is two-fold.  First, it has the potential to sweep too broadly.  
Once notified of a complaint, ISPs and website operators might take down 
postings simply to avoid liability, no matter how innocuous the postings might 
be.  Second, such a regime would be ineffective, because by the time a victim 
realizes the problem, notifies the website operator, and has the material 
removed, it may have spread to other sites, becoming effectively impossible to 
contain.412  At best, these regimes would modestly mitigate the still-substantial 
harm done by online mobs.  Malicious posters would have no reason to refrain 
from acting abusively in the future, and the website operators would have no 
reason to change the configuration of their websites to hamper further 
anonymous attacks.  Conversely, common targets of online mobs would 
continue to have reason to fear blogging in their own names or even speaking 
out offline in settings where they could irritate persons that might retaliate 
online.  Something different is needed to deter online mobs’ unlawful conduct. 
An orderly articulation of the standard of care for ISPs and website 
operators is essential.  First, it should require website operators to configure 
their sites to collect and retain visitors’ IP addresses.413  In other words, the 
standard of care should demand “traceable anonymity.”414  This would allow 
posters to comment anonymously to the outside world but permit their identity 
to be traced in the event they engage in unlawful behavior.  Requiring 
traceable anonymity is hardly a burdensome step: some blogs already deny 
access to anonymous posters.415 
Traceable anonymity would not betray our commitment to anonymous 
speech if site operators and ISPs refuse to reveal a poster’s identity unless a 
court order demanded it.  This would protect individuals for whom anonymity 
 
411 See, e.g., Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects?” 
Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 623 (2006) (discussing the high incidence of 
abuse of the “notice and takedown” process for copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 
512(b) (2000)). 
412 See Posting of Ross Tucker to Tech Policy Seminar, 
http://picker.typepad.com/picker_seminar/2008/04/isp-liability-a.html (Apr. 28, 2008, 
12:34). 
413 Lemley, supra note 389, at 22 n.74.  It may be reasonable to insist that websites and 
ISPs retain such data for three years, which should provide plaintiffs sufficient time to 
investigate and pursue claims.  This would accord with many statutes of limitations for tort 
claims and would not impose a high price tag given the falling costs associated with data 
storage. 
414 SOLOVE, supra note 4, at 146; Tal Z. Zarsky, Thinking Outside the Box: Considering 
Transparency, Anonymity, and Pseudonymity as Overall Solutions to the Problems of 
Information Privacy in the Internet Society, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 991, 1028-32 (2004). 
415 For instance, the legal blog Concurring Opinions, where I am a permanent member, 
tracks commentators’ IP addresses.  See SOLOVE, supra note 4, at 146 (describing the 
traceable anonymity at Concurring Opinions, which he founded). 
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is most crucial, such as victims of domestic violence and political dissidents.  
At present, courts protect the identity of anonymous posters from frivolous 
lawsuits by setting forth a series of requirements before granting John Doe 
subpoenas.416  Those requirements should, at the very least, include proof that 
the claims would survive a motion for summary judgment.417  This would 
assure posters of the safety of their anonymity in the face of baseless 
allegations. 
A standard of care that includes traceable anonymity would allow society to 
enjoy the free expression that anonymity facilitates without eliminating means 
to combat anonymity’s dark side – the tendency to act destructively when we 
believe we cannot get caught.418  As Justice Scalia has explained, because 
anonymity makes lying easier, the identification of speakers can significantly 
deter the spreading of false rumors and allow us to locate and punish the 
source of such rumors.419 
Second, as screening software advances, some classes of online actors may 
reasonably be expected to deploy the software to limit the amount and kinds of 
harmful materials on their sites.420  This certainly is wholly consistent with the 
Communications Decency Act’s objectives.  As Susan Freiwald explains, 
reducing defamation through technological means may be possible if 
companies invested in code to make it feasible.421  Naturally, online actors 
 
416 Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 457 (Del. 2005) (holding that “a defamation plaintiff 
must satisfy a ‘summary judgment’ standard before obtaining the identity of an anonymous 
defendant”); Nathaniel Gleicher, Note, John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent 
Standard, 118 YALE L.J.  (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 29, on file with the author).  
Mark Lemley offers an alternative to a Doe lawsuit – granting subpoenas upon a showing of 
good cause without a lawsuit where the ISP or website operator would be required to notify 
the defendant and give him a chance to contest the subpoena anonymously, either in court or 
in the administrative process suggested above.  Lemley, supra note 389, at 21-22.  Some 
extreme libertarians might object on privacy grounds to a standard of care requiring 
retention of visitors’ IP addresses.  They might argue that it could facilitate spying and 
overreaching.  As discussed above, the commitment to allowing anonymous speech has 
never extended to shield criminal or tortious behavior.  See supra Section IV.A.  Moreover, 
First Amendment considerations are greatly attenuated when it is not the government, but a 
large number of independent private entities retaining the sensitive information, and where 
those whose information is held voluntarily chose to visit and post on those websites. 
417 E.g., Cahill, 884 A.2d at 457. 
418 SOLOVE, supra note 4, at 140; see also supra notes 159-160 (discussing 
deindividuation caused by anonymity). 
419 McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 382 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
420 Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 21-22), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1261344) (describing the falling costs 
and technological advances which have produced deep-packet inspection technologies, 
allowing ISPs to record and monitor all their consumers’ Internet communications, 
including e-mails, web surfing, instant messages, and the like). 
421 Freiwald, supra note 376, at 629. 
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would not be liable for the inevitable failures of this software to screen out all 
offensive material as § 230 demands.  But making a reasonable good faith 
attempt to conduct cost-effective screening could significantly reduce harm.422 
Third, and more generally, the duty of care should take into account 
differences among online entities.  ISPs and massive blogs with hundreds or 
thousands of postings a day cannot plausibly monitor the content of all 
postings.423  The duty of care will also surely evolve as technology improves.  
Current screening technology is far more effective against some kinds of 
abusive material than others; progress may produce cost-effective means of 
defeating other attacks.  Conversely, technological advances will likely offer 
online mobs new means of carrying out their assaults, creating new risks 
against which victims can ask website operators to take reasonable precautions. 
CONCLUSION 
Scholars and activists began developing a cyber civil liberties agenda from 
the earliest days of the Internet.  Although preservation of those liberties 
requires constant vigilance, they have accomplished much.  Unfortunately, the 
Internet’s impact on civil rights has gone largely neglected to date.  As a result, 
something with the potential to be a great engine of equality has all too often 
reflected and reinforced the offline world’s power imbalances.  The brutality of 
online mobs is an important part of that story, but it is only a part.  Scholars 
and activists need to devote the same attention to online threats to civil rights 
that they have to civil liberties.  This Article aims to open that discussion. 
 
 
422 Some kinds of attacks, such as doctored, sexually suggestive pictures, may be easier 
to screen out than others, such as defamation.  Nonetheless, crafting screening algorithms is 
a sophisticated enterprise; lay judges should be wary of speculating about what can and 
cannot be accomplished.  See Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. 
Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 668 (7th Cir. 2008) (suggesting that racially discriminatory 
real estate ads cannot be eliminated because offering a “red brick house with white trim” is 
lawful). 
423 Jack Balkin argues that the risk of unconstitutional collateral censorship is high for 
entities that do not sit in the best position to detect unlawful activities, including ISPs who 
cannot oversee the postings of customers, and bookstore owners who cannot possibility 
inspect all of the books on the shelves.  J.M. Balkin, Essay, Free Speech and Hostile 
Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295, 2302-04 (1999). 
